

Affirmative Kritik Answers

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FYI

These answers are organized to answer three primary elements of the negative kritik produced for the ENDI. 1) Defenses of constructing ocean environments in terms of development/resources in addition to intrinsically valuable (or the variety of other possible options). 2) Defenses against criticisms of development, capitalism, and consumption-oriented solutions to climate change – in particular, with regards to wind/alternative energy. 3) Defenses of the climate change advantage against criticisms of treating climate change as a large-scale, global, and scientifically verifiable impact best addressed through reforming existing energy/environmental policy. These different sections are internally consistent with a 2AC strategy designed to go for a permutation, case outweighs, and turns to an alternative that refuses reformist politics. The reason for separating these sections is to encourage 2ACs to write blocks/make choices based on INC links.

Development/Capitalism

Alternative Energy

Sustainable technology development to solve climate change is the best common ground. Total critiques of development undermine political freedom and provide no path forward.

Chris **SNEDDON** Geography @ Dartmouth **ET AL** '6 "Sustainable development in a Post-Brundtland World" *Ecological Economics* 57 p. 259-263 [acronyms clarified – Turner]

Mainstream SD has proceeded apace since the advent of the Brundtland Report. While the risk of cooptation and abuse of SD, often entailing a watering down of its more radical prescriptions for enhancing sustainability, has been repeatedly noted (see Le'le', 1991; Luke, 1995; Sneddon, 2000; Fernando, 2003), the concept is now **firmly entrenched** within many government offices, corporate boardrooms, and the hallways of international NGOs and financial institutions. At the very least, the staying power of SD can be explained by its propensity for providing some **common ground** for discussion among a range of developmental and environmental actors who are frequently at odds (Pezzoli, 1997). Its strongest boosters—for example, those in international environmental NGOs and intergovernmental agencies—thus feel fairly comfortable advancing a concept that is most effective in bringing former adversaries to the table even while accomplishing precious little in the way of concrete outcomes. Supporters of SD at these levels continue to advocate reform of existing institutions to better accommodate SD principles. Conversely, critics of the mainstream position advocate more radical societal changes, and have comprehensively and incisively deconstructed SD's [sustainable development's] basic contradictions (e.g., Redclift, 1987; J. O'Connor, 1994) and its power-laden, problematic assumptions (e.g., Escobar, 1995). However, they have **left little more than ashes** in its place. We can agree with Escobar, that the bBrundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition (Escobar, 1996, pp. 53–54). At the same time, we argue as well for a resurrection of SD into a more conceptually potent and politically effective set of ideas and practices that comprise an empowering tale. We advocate a middle and pragmatic path, one that takes seriously calls for radical changes in our ideas and institutions dealing with sustainable development, while also holding out the possibility that genuine reform of current institutions may be possible. Partial reform may pre-empt necessary radical change, but it may also make it easier in the future⁷. Our first intervention is to declare a truce among the epistemological and methodological schisms that separate the defenders of sustainable development from critics of the concept. For its advocates—identified most closely with development practitioners situated in a variety of United Nations offices (e.g., United Nations Development Program), government agencies (e.g., ministries and departments of natural resources and environment), and corporate boardrooms (e.g., the Business Council for Sustainable Development)—sustainable development as laid out by the WCED (broadly) remains the **most tenable principle** of **collective action** for resolving the twin crises of environment and development. For many academics—particularly those associated with ecological economics and related fields (see Soderbaum, 2000; Daly and Farley, 2004)—sustainable development offers an attractive, perhaps the only, alternative to conventional growth-oriented development thinking. However, for some of its socio-cultural critics (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1999; Fernando, 2003), mainstream SD is a ruse, yet another attempt to discount the aspirations and needs of marginalized populations across the planet in the name of green development. Other critics, while broadly sympathetic towards its goals, point out SD's fundamental lack of attention to the powerful political and economic structures of the

international system that constrain and shape even the most well-intentioned policies (e.g., Redclift, 1987, 1997)⁸. For critics grounded in the ecological sciences (e.g., Frazier, 1997; Dawe and Ryan, 2003), SD is unforgivably anthropocentric and thus unable to dissolve the false barriers between the human sphere of economic and social activities and the ecological sphere that sustains these activities⁹. These divisions reflect more than simply different value positions and attendant political goals. Proponents of a mainstream version of SD tend to see knowledge production (epistemology) and research design (methodology) in very specific terms. At the risk of caricature, this position demonstrates tendencies towards individualism, economism and technological optimism in assessing how knowledge about the social world is brought into being (Faber et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004). SD advocates also place a great deal of faith in quantitative representations of complex human-environment relations, in part because of a desire to present generalizable knowledge to policy makers. Conversely, critics of SD are for the most part social constructivist in perspective, arguing that knowledge of the world always represents a series of mediations among human social relations and individual identities (see Robinson, 2004, pp. 379–380; Demeritt, 2002). Critics are also more apt to stress the historical contingency of development processes, and undertake qualitative studies grounded in a case study methodology. Perhaps most importantly, while advocates of a conventional SD continue to perceive the policy process as a genuine pathway towards reform, critics have largely given up on state-dominated institutions as a means of change. Despite these substantial differences in perspective, our intimation is that both advocates and critics would agree that a socially just and ecologically sustainable world, or even an approximation, would be a desirable end.

3.2. Embracing pluralism: ecological economics, political ecology and freedom-oriented development We argue that we can move beyond the **ideological and epistemological straightjackets** that deter **more cohesive** and politically effective interpretations of SD, in order to operationalize the aforementioned **truce**, by embracing pluralism. We argue that ecological economics, as an explicitly transdisciplinary enterprise, in tandem with political ecology, freedom oriented development, and deliberative democracy, offer important means for advancing our understandings of the local–global politics of sustainability. Recent discussions within ecological economics have highlighted the need for the field to expand its methodological and epistemological purview (Gale, 1998; Peterson, 2000; Nelson, 2001; Muradian and Martinez-Alier, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002) to engage more directly with a wide variety of non-academic political actors (Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2004; Norgaard, 2004) and to confront its future direction as either a more specialized, if somewhat narrow normal science or a more integrative, creative bpost-normalQ science (Mu ller, 2003). Ecological economics has also introduced a series of innovative methodological approaches for interpreting and assessing sustainability. Some of these include calculations of intergenerational equity (Howarth, 1997, 2003; Padilla, 2002), differentiations of bweakQ versus bstrongQ sustainability (in essence debates over the substitutability of ecosystem-derived resources) (Norton and Toman, 1997; Neumayer, 2003), the valuation of ecosystem services (Costanza et al., 1997; Spash, 2000), broadening our interpretation of environmental bvaluesQ (Bukett, 2003) and the burgeoning work on sustainability indicators (e.g., Bell and Morse, 1999). Taken as a whole, ecological economics may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad vision of SD advanced by Brundtland. It has done so, largely thus far, by providing a bridge between economics and ecology (see Norton and Toman, 1997). We contend that additional bridges need further development. For example, the role of power, from local to global scales, needs to be more consistently incorporated into ecological economics. The analysis of power relationships is a central concern of political ecology, particularly power as expressed through the discourse and practices of multiple actors (including households, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], social movements, communities, capitalist enterprises, and state agents and institutional networks) who cooperate and come into conflict over specific development projects or other state-and market-mediated activities (Peluso and Watts, 2001, p. 25). Key contributors to political

ecology including Joan Martinez-Alier (2002), Martin O'Connor (1994a,b), and Ramachandra Guha (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1999; Guha, 2000) have provided leadership and intellectual fuel to ecological economics, yet the vast majority of articles in the journal *Ecological Economics* do not address the social and ecological implications of power relations. The field of political ecology has also attracted an array of anthropologists, geographers, environmental historians and associated social scientists united by efforts to clarify the ways in which resource degradation and conflicts are derived from particular political and economic processes (Emel and Peet, 1989). Political ecologists also stress the need to take seriously recent insights from ecological theory, particularly those associated with nonlinearity and complexity (Zimmerer, 1994), and undertake research that seeks to link a rigorous characterization of ecological transformation to the local, national and global processes (cultural, political– economic) that are driving such changes (see Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). The result has been a series of case studies—mostly but not exclusively focused on third-world contexts (see McCarthy, 2001; Walker, 2003)—detailing the varying ways that environmental conflicts (over forests, water, fisheries, agroecosystems, biodiversity and other socioecological entities) are constituted through struggles over access to resources and the benefits accruing from resource exploitation (Peluso, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Additionally, both ecological economics and political ecology have offered potent critiques of development theory and practice (see M. O'Connor, 1994a; Peet and Watts, 1996). At a general level, these are by now well-rehearsed. Indeed, anti-development narratives have progressed to the point where a fairly well-defined field—post-development studies—is emergent (see Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). In spite of, and in some ways because of, the numerous and varied deconstructions of development (see Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Crush, 1995; Sachs et al., 1998), we argue that the linkage of sustainability with the vilified concept of development need not be the death-knell of sustainable development that many have taken it to be. Again, in the interests of reconstructing the conceptual landscape of sustainable development, we argue that some politically savvy and ethically defensible semblance of development is salvageable. And a useful place to start is found in the work of Amartya Sen (1999).

Development as Freedom is an incisive and comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which economic and social debates about development have failed to struggle with fundamental issues regarding ethics, human rights and individual freedoms. These are issues that concerned the political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries. Recovering these concerns, Sen uses freedom as a lens to interrogate the traditional foci of development studies and practice such as poverty, food production, women's role in development, market versus state institutions, welfare and culture. We contend that Sen's approach peels back a great deal of the posturing, reification and instrumentalism found in the development literature. It does so by making the normative claim that development is ultimately about freedom (e.g., political rights and responsibilities, economic and social opportunities, transparency guarantees in social interactions), in contrast to a narrowly defined yet widely adopted identification of development with aggregate economic growth. If there is one noticeable gap in Sen's analysis, it is a lack of concern with the environment and ecological changes. One of Sen's most important contributions is the way he uses a freedom-based understanding of development to confront narrower versions focused solely on aggregate levels of economic growth. In a related work, Anand and Sen (2000; see also Brekke and Howarth, 2002) provide a trenchant critique of what they call the opulence-oriented approach to development¹⁰. As they put it, the fundamental difficulty with the approach of wealth maximization and with the tradition of judging success by overall opulence of a society is a deep-seated failure to come to terms with the universalist unbiasedness needed for an adequate understanding of social justice and human development (Anand and Sen, 2000, p. 2031). In Sen we can begin to see a way to radically alter the general orientation of development, away from its obsession with an aggregate, ill-defined wealth towards a rigorously defined notion of freedom that builds on ideals of social justice and human dignity. Taken together, the three approaches sketched above offer a wide range of methodologies, normative positions, and ways of

understanding human-environment relations from which to approach sustainable development discourses and practices in the postBrundtland era. Table 1 summarizes the contributions of these approaches to a pluralistic, transdisciplinary strategy for confronting sustainability¹¹. We argue that such an approach can begin a conversation about critical aspects of sustainability that hitherto have been overlooked in the numerous debates about the subject. It is our sense that the normative underpinnings of sustainable development (e.g., ethical commitments across generations, development as enhanced freedoms) and the political programs that might follow have received some treatment in the context of SD debates, but have never been satisfactorily used together. It is our hope that the socio-theoretical and normative tools sketched above be used to (1) continue the ongoing interrogation of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice, and (2) reconstruct a normative vision of sustainable development that is simultaneously attuned to the danger of cooptation on the part of powerful actors hoping to give unsustainable activities a bsustainableQ veneer and the need for a sustainability politics that transcends calls for the **overhaul of everything**. In a postBrundtland world, decisions over environmental governance (e.g., the deployment of ecologically deleterious technologies, economic development pathways and human consumption patterns) are a function of both fragmenting and integrating forces occurring at multiple scales. Our vision of pluralistic sustainability research and praxis calls for recognition of the inherently political nature of the conflicts that arise from such forces, for example, over Third World states' desire to construct massive hydroelectric schemes or industrialized countries' relative **inaction on climate change**. Advocates of sustainable development might wrestle with these conflicts in any number of ways—by inserting oneself as facilitator, advocate or witness into discussions over **specific projects**, or by researching and calling for a decision-making process that incorporates multiple perspectives—but it is our sense that this is how we must proceed for any advancement of SD policies and politics.

Alternative energy capitalism solves climate change – crisis or revolution fails.

Peter NEWELL IR @ Sussex AND Matthew PATTERSON Political Studies @ Ottawa '10
Climate Capitalism p. 8-10

But if one premise for this book is that climate change entails an enormous transformation of how capitalism operates, then our other premise is that despite resistance, in fact an embryonic form of climate capitalism is already emerging. The chapters that follow elaborate how the ways that governments, corporations and non-governmental actors have responded to climate change are best understood as an effort to decarbonise the global economy. Of course this development is patchy - some governments are more active than others, some businesses much more entrepreneurial and far-sig~ted than others - but the foundations of such an economy are nevertheless in the process of being built. These foundations can be characterised as different types of carbon markets, which put a price on carbon, and thus create incentives to reduce emissions. These sorts of response to climate change are also highly problematic of course. Many readers will already have prejudices against, or at least worries about, treating the atmosphere like a commodity to be bought and sold, or about buying carbon offsets to enable the rich to continue their high-consuming lifestyles with a clear conscience. We share these worries. But there is something about climate change that makes it **unique** amongst environmental problems. The origins of climate change are deeply rooted in the development of the global capitalist economy. The ways the world has responded to climate change have been conditioned by the sort of free-market capitalism which has prevailed since the early 1980s. To respond to climate change

successfully entails decarbonising that economy, to re-structure or dismantle huge economic sectors on which the whole of global development has been based. This is in sharp contrast to efforts to deal with ozone depletion, which involved the elimination of a relatively small batch of chemicals with specific uses by a handful of leading companies. Likewise, we can deal with most forms of water pollution by banning certain applications offertilisers, dealing with human and animal wastes, and controls on what chemical industries can discharge into rivers and lakes. To ban these practices, while often inconvenient for the companies involved, is hardly a challenge to the whole edifice of global capitalism. In contrast, to propose to ban all further coal and oil use, as some have done, is both unrealistic and deeply problematic. The use of these fuels is currently so widespread that simply to ban them would cause economic growth to collapse. And a lack of growth is something that the capitalist system in which we live simply cannot tolerate - it would collapse as a system. So the challenge of climate change means, in effect, either abandoning capitalism, or seeking to find a way for it to grow while gradually replacing coal, oil and gas. Assuming the former is unlikely in the short term, the questions to be asked are, what can growth be based on? What are the energy sources to power a decarbonised economy? Which powerful actors might be brought on board to overcome resistance from the oil and coal companies? And for those worried (including us) about the image of unbridled free-market capitalism as managing the climate for us, then we are forced to address the questions: What type of climate capitalism do we want? Can it be made to serve desirable social, as well as environmental, ends? And what might it take to bring it about? 9In this context, a response that focuses on creating markets, where money can be made for trading carbon allowances within limits set by governments, is rather appealing. Against the backdrop of the problems of recalcitrant industries and reluctant consumers, it creates the possibility of economic winners from decarbonisation. What's more, those winners - financiers - are rather powerful, and can support you as you build the policies which might produce decarbonisation overall. Trading on its own clearly won't be enough, but it does provide a powerful constituency that benefits from climate-change policy, which is crucial politically. Turning this into a successful project for decarbonisation requires constructing altogether different models of growth that do not depend on abundant and cheap fossil fuels, one that may actually reward reductions in energy use and its more efficient use. This means decoupling emissions growth from economic growth. The key question is whether capitalists can find ways of doing new business in a way that helps to achieve decarbonisation. They need to be able to do this in a way which brings on board those that will be doing less business in a low-carbon economy, or at least to provide enough growth overall for policymakers to be able to override their resistance.

Perm - Cap

Perm net-benefit – proposing alternative non-capitalist economics out of nowhere is of zero value. Environmental reform of capitalism is key.

John **BARRY** Reader in Politics @ Belfast **‘7** “Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation to economic security” Int. J. Green Economics, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 2007 p. 447-448

Economic analysis has been one of the weakest and least developed areas of broadly green/sustainable development thinking. For example, whatever analysis there is within the green political canon is largely utopian – usually based on an argument for the complete transformation of modern society and economy as the only way to deal with ecological catastrophe, an often linked to a critique of the socioeconomic failings of capitalism that echoed a broadly radical Marxist/socialist or anarchist analysis; or underdeveloped – due, in part, to the need to outline and develop other aspects of green political theory. However, this gap within green thinking has recently been filled by a number of scholars, activists, think tanks, and environmental NGOs who have outlined various models of green political economy to underpin sustainable development political aims, principles and objectives. The aim of this article is to offer a draft of a realistic, but critical, version of green political economy to underpin the economic dimensions of radical views about sustainable development. It is written explicitly with a view to encouraging others to think through this aspect of sustainable development in a collaborative manner. Combined realism and radicalism marks this article, which starts with the point that we cannot build or seek to create a sustainable economy ab nihlo, but must begin from where we are, with the structures, institutions, modes of production, laws and regulations that we already have. Of course, this does not mean simply accepting these as immutable or set in stone; after all, some of the current institutions, principles and structures underpinning the dominant economic model are the very causes of unsustainable development. We do need to recognise, however, that we must work with (and ‘through’ – in the terms of the original German Green Party’s slogan of ‘marching through the institutions’) these existing structures, as well as change and reform and in some cases, abandon them as either unnecessary or positively harmful to the creation and maintenance of a sustainable economy and society. Equally, this article also recognises that an alternative economy and society must be based in the reality that most people (in the West) will not democratically vote for a completely different type of society and economy. That reality must also accept that a ‘green economy’ is one that is recognisable to most people and that indeed safeguards and guarantees not just their basic needs but also aspirations (within limits). The realistic character of the thinking behind this article accepts that consumption and materialistic lifestyles are here to stay (so long as they do not transgress any of the critical thresholds of the triple bottom line) and indeed there is little to be gained by proposing alternative economic systems, which start from a complete rejection of consumption and materialism. The appeal to realism is in part an attempt to correct the common misperception (and self-perception) of green politics and economics requiring an excessive degree of self-denial and a puritanical asceticism (Goodin, 1992, p.18; Allison, 1991, p.170–178). While rejecting the claim that green political theory calls for the complete disavowal of materialistic lifestyles, it is true that green politics does require the collective reassessment of such lifestyles, and does require a degree of shared sacrifice. It does not mean, however, that we necessarily require the complete and across-the-board rejection of materialistic lifestyles. There must be room and tolerance in a green economy for people to live ‘ungreen lives’ so long as they do not ‘harm’ others, threaten long-term ecological sustainability or create unjust levels of socioeconomic inequalities. Thus, realism in this context is in part another name for the acceptance of a broadly ‘liberal’ or ‘post-liberal’ (but certainly not anti-liberal) green perspective.¹

Reformist strategy has broad legitimacy that is key to success.

John **BARRY** Reader in Politics @ Belfast **‘7** “Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation to economic security” Int. J. Green Economics, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 2007 p. 460 [**acronym clarified**-Turner]

Viewed by itself, EM [ecological modernisation] is a reformist and limited strategy for achieving a more sustainable economy and society, and indeed, questions could be legitimately asked as to whether the development of a recognisably 'green' political economy for sustainable development can be based on it, I nevertheless contend that there are strategic advantages in seeking to build upon and radicalise EM. While there are various reasons one can give for this, in this conclusion I will focus on two – one normative/principled, the other strategic. From a strategic point of view, it is clear that, as Dryzek *et al.* (2003) have shown, if green and sustainability goals, aims and objectives are to be integrated within state policy, these need to attach themselves to one of the core state imperatives – accumulation/economic growth or legitimacy (Barry, 2003b). It is clear that the discourse on EM allows (some) green objectives to be integrated/translated into a policy language and framework which complements and does not undermine the state's core imperative of pursuing orthodox economic growth. Therefore, in the absence of a Green Party forming a government or being part of a ruling coalition (or even more unlikely, of one of the main traditional parties initiating policies consistent with a radical understanding of sustainable development), the best that can be hoped for under current political conditions is the 'greening of growth and capitalism' i.e., EM. On a more principled note, the adoption of EM as a starting point for the development of a model/theory of green political economy does carry with it the not inconsiderable benefit of removing the 'anti-growth' and 'limits to growth' legacy, which has (in my view) held back the theoretical development of a positive, attractive, modern conceptualisation of green political economy and radical conceptualisations of sustainable development. Here, the technological innovation, the role of regulation driving innovation and efficiency, the promise that the transition to a more sustainable economy and society do not necessarily mean completely abandoning currently lifestyles and aspirations – strategically important in generating democratic support for sustainable development, and as indicated above, important if the vision of a green sustainable economy is one that promotes diversity and tolerance in lifestyles and does not demand everyone conform to a putative 'green' lifestyle. Equally, this approach does not completely reject the positive role/s of a regulated market within sustainable development. However, it does demand a clear shift towards making the promotion of economic security (and quality of life) central to economic policy. Only when this happens can we say that we have begun the transition to implementing the principles of sustainable development rather than fruitlessly seeking for some 'greenprint' of an abstract and utopian vision of the 'sustainable society'.

Perm Net Benefits

Reformism avoids worst forms of capitalism – harnesses productive power.

Sheri BERMAN Poli Sci @ Barnard '11 “What Marx Forgot” *Dissent* Fall p. 98-99

Yet Marx and his oeuvre had one glaring gap—politics. In Hobsbawm's words, “There is no analogous systematic theoretical effort [to Marx's economic, historical or sociological work] about politics. His writing in this field takes the form, almost entirely, of journalism, inquests on the immediate political past, contributions to discussion within the movement, and private letters.” To use a Marxist expression, this weakness or omission is no accident: it stems from the essential nature of Marxism and reveals something critically important about its failings as a doctrine, ideology, and guide to history. And it also reveals something about the failings of those, like Hobsbawm, who refused to abandon Marxism during the course of the twentieth century. Marx neglected politics because he did not consider it important. For Marx, politics was subordinated to economics: its nature and forms were determined by the larger economic context in which they were embedded. Politics, he felt, was not an independent but a dependent variable; it did not shape historical development but was shaped by it. Since the inevitable triumph of socialism would have little to do with political effort and everything to do with economic development and the changes in society it wrought, why waste time analyzing politics? Marx also found politics distasteful. Politics in the capitalist era, he and Engels believed, was merely the arena in which class conflict played itself out, the sphere in which the dominant class (the bourgeoisie) exerted its power over the proletariat. With the transition to socialism, the need for domination would disappear and the need for a state, or politics more generally, diminish. As a result, they provided “no concrete guidance” on political issues to their followers, no “strategic or tactical instruction” on how socialists should maneuver in the political sphere. Hobsbawm recognizes that this became a major problem over time. Because capitalism did not in fact collapse and socialism did not triumph effortlessly, socialists found themselves in a pickle by the late nineteenth century. Should they sit around and wait, hoping that somehow the longed-for transition would nonetheless miraculously occur? Or should they act, figuring out some other way to try to bend history to their will? As Lenin put it, what was to be done? Lenin's own answer was to try to push history forward through the efforts of a revolutionary vanguard able and willing to use whatever means necessary to realize the desired outcomes. Perhaps because the awful consequences of Lenin's attempt to deal with this failing of Marxism are now clear to all, Hobsbawm focuses instead on another attempt to fill Marxism's political hole, that offered by Antonio Gramsci. Hobsbawm argues that Gramsci “pioneered a Marxist theory of politics” and, unlike the founders, drew “attention to a crucial aspect of the construction of socialism as well as the winning of socialism.” Gramsci recognized that bourgeois domination was not maintained only directly, through repression, but also indirectly, through the construction of cultural hegemony. Marxist intellectuals, he argued, needed to uncover the nature and workings of this cultural hegemony and help create a proletarian version to counter and replace it. It is hardly surprising that such views have appealed to intellectuals over the years, and the concept of cultural hegemony is indeed a contribution to the understanding of methods of domination. Still, it is not at all clear that Gramsci can in any significant way really be said to have “changed the world”: he inspired no major political movement, and it is hard to see, practically, what his impact has been on the lives of those suffering from the injustices of capitalism. The fact that Gramsci is where Hobsbawm (and his Marxism) ends up shows the limits of his own approach. But Lenin and Gramsci, of course, were not the only socialists to put forward solutions for Marxism's political problem, nor even the most successful. That honor belongs to a group of theorists, activists, and politicians Hobsbawm essentially ignores—those who moved past

Marxism to create a new ideological movement, one that would later come to be called social democracy. During the late nineteenth century, one group of Marxist revisionists, the most famous of whom was Eduard Bernstein, began to recognize that Marx's predictions about the **inevitable collapse** of capitalism were **untrue** and that the capitalist system was actually becoming increasingly **complex and adaptable**. They began to argue that the correct role for socialist parties was to **reform** it, **using the power of existing democratic states**. In short, they agreed with Lenin that a political path to a better world was necessary, but unlike him they believed this path could and should be a democratic one—and that **it was possible to eliminate capitalism's worst effects while harnessing its best ones**. Hobsbawm largely ignores social democracy, except to proclaim its exhaustion and death in recent decades. But it was precisely the social democratic movement that ultimately emerged from the pioneering efforts of Bernstein and his colleagues that has been the most important and durable legacy of the Marxist tradition. The founders of social democracy began as Marxists, but left the fold when its flaws and lacunae became too glaring to paper over—something Lenin, Gramsci, and Hobsbawm himself could never bring themselves to do. The result of this apostasy was the creation in the interwar years, and the global spread after 1945, of a new politico-economic order in the advanced industrial world, one that reshaped the relationship between states, markets and society. In social democracies, states committed themselves to **protecting their citizens from the worst excesses of capitalism** and to reining in market forces in a wide variety of ways, even as they continued to reap many of capitalism's **enormous benefits**. The new order that emerged after 1945 helped bring an end to the class conflict and social divisions that had plagued the modern era since the onset of capitalism and helped doom previous democratic experiments. It also generated levels of **sustained growth, prosperity, and social equity greater than any the world had previously experienced**. The social democratic postwar order, in other words, attempted, and to a large degree succeeded, in reconciling the two "halves" of capitalism that Marx had begun analyzing a century before. This order has certainly frayed in recent decades. But no serious person advocates a return to the pre-social-democratic past—a world of true laissez-faire—or, at least in the short to mid term, a post-capitalist future. Instead, what is needed today is a revitalized social democratic model, one based upon recognition that capitalism is the best way of producing the wealth and technological progress all human beings crave, but the equally important recognition that if left alone, capitalism will produce untold suffering and dislocation. It must be based, in other words, upon the fundamentally Marxist recognition that **capitalism's productive and destructive tendencies are inextricably intertwined, and the democratic revisionists' conviction that sensible political activism can master both aspects of the capitalist bequest**. Because his Marxist sympathies remain intact, Hobsbawm neither recognizes nor appreciates how much the social democratic break with Marxism produced. Without it, we are left with the view that Marxism's greatest political champions were figures such as Lenin and Gramsci. I imagine most readers of Dissent—let alone the multitudinous beneficiaries of the advanced industrial world's unprecedented recent decades of peace, prosperity, and democracy—would prefer to follow the likes of Eduard Bernstein.

AT: Neoliberalism Impact

You should reject their impact framing and theory of social interaction. The terminology of “neoliberalism” encourages fake radicalism, oversimplification, and greater levels of cooptation than positive and pragmatic environmental politics.

Clive **BARNETT** Faculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) **5** “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’” *Geoforum* 36 (1) p. Science Direct

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps **the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether.** For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, *Journal of Social Policy* 33 (2004), pp. 27–48. Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc.

opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens' movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to "hegemonic neoliberalism". And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of "democracy" (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of "neoliberalism" have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of "neoliberalism" have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of "individualized collective-action" (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of "neoliberal hegemony": environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault's ideas into the Marxist narrative of "neoliberalism" sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of "neoliberalism" are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of "neoliberalism" frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of "neoliberalism" reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of "neoliberalism" invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of "neoliberalism" and "neoliberalization" is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the

language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

AT: Cap Root Cause

Capitalism isn't the root cause of environmental destruction. empirical studies prove ecological capitalism can create *structural change* and net declines in resource use.

Arthur **MOL** Environmental Sociology @ Wageningen **'2K** "The Environmental Movement in an Era of Ecological Modernisation" *Geoforum* 31 p. EBSCO

In the 1980s increasing numbers of environmental sociologists, and other social scientists who had environmental deterioration and reform as their central object of study, started to observe that some significant changes were taking place in both the environmental discourse and the social practices and institutions that actually dealt with environmental problems. Out of the sometimes vigorous debates concerning the interpretation of these transformations, their structural or incidental character, their geographical reach and their normative valuation, the theory of ecological modernisation emerged. For example, some empirical studies showed that from the mid to late 1980s onwards, in countries such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the USA, Sweden and Denmark, a discontinuity could be identified in the tendency of enhanced economic growth to be paralleled by increased environmental disruption – a process referred to as the decoupling or delinking of material flows from economic flows. In a number of cases (countries and/or specific industrial sectors and/or specific environmental issues) it was actually claimed that environmental reform resulted in an absolute decline of emissions and use of natural resources, regardless of growth in financial or material terms (cf. recently for the Netherlands RIVM, 1998). However, although these – sometimes controversial – empirical studies lie behind the idea of ecological modernisation, they do not form the core. Central stage in ecological modernisation is given to the associated social practices and institutional transformations, which are often believed to be at the foundations of these physical changes. In the debate on the changing character of the social practices and institutions since the 1980s, adherents to the theory of ecological modernisation positioned themselves by claiming that these transformations in institutions and social practices could not be explained away as mere window-dressing or rhetoric, but should indeed be seen as structural transformations in industrial society's institutional order, as far as these concerned the preservation of its sustenance base.

Capitalism/industrial tech isn't the root cause of environmental destruction.

Arthur **MOL** Environmental Sociology @ Wageningen **AND** Gert **SPAARGAREN** Globus Inst. @ Tilburg **'2K** "Ecological Modernisation Theory in Debate: Review" *Environmental Politics* 9 (1) p. 34-38

• Environmental versus Social Change There seem to be various flavours in radical ecologism but we will focus on those streams that stands for basically two things. First, a critique of the anthropocentric view of the interrelation between humans/society and nature/the environment. Second, a critique of industrial society and its technology for disregarding the (physical) limits to growth/development. As most radical ecologists authors have it, both points of critique - on modern societies' culture and structure respectively - cannot be resolved unless there is something like a revolution, a radical and profound alteration of the basic institutions of modern society. The environmental crisis poses a problem to society which cannot be dealt with using the conventional sociological theories on social change and which cannot adequately be resolved within the present-day institutional make-up of modern societies. At the roots of the environmental crisis are the culture and structure of western industrial society as they were shaped over two or more centuries. All attempts to remedy the problem without basically questioning the overall structure and culture are bound to fail. If we are precise, radical ecologism is at the same time radical on its environmental goals as radical on the existing social structure and culture. Some authors within the radical ecologism perspective add additional radical claims at the same priority level (on democracy, emancipation, social justice/equality, etc., often neglecting possible conflicts between these priorities), while others give ecological goals pride of place. The basic presumption is usually that radical reforms of society's culture and structure not only contribute to, but are a prerequisite for, these desired goals. To a

major extent Ecological Modernisation Theory shares with radical eco-centrists such as Robyn Eckersley [1992], John Dryzek [1987; 1997] and the later André Gorz [1989] the starting position that environmental claims are subsumed in society's structure and culture and that consequently production and consumption processes should be radically improved regarding their environmental impact. However, it diverges from radical ecologism on two levels. First, Ecological Modernisation perspectives - and these are of course not alone or unique in this - do not give environmental objectives an undisputed priority above other societal objectives. Consequently, environmental reforms should not only be judged on their contribution to preserving the ecosystem, but also on other - sometimes conflicting - social values. And although the current relatively marginalised position of environmental interests (for example, vis-a-vis economic interests) allows some priority setting on environmental goals today, this cannot be an indisputable position based on some kind of 'objective' reason. Second, radical proposals for environmental improvement do not automatically entail radical societal change in the sense promoted by eco-centrists. Ecological Modernisation Theory claims that not only the environmental debate, but also actual social practices and institutions involving society-nature interactions, are already transforming to a major extent within the boundaries set by the current institutional order, showing that a tight coupling of environmental improvements and radical social change can at least be questioned. There is no - or better: no longer any - simple one to one relationship between radical environmental goals and radical social transformations, as eco-centrists seem to believe. On a theoretical level, ecological modernisation theorists have labelled this the growing independence of the ecological sphere and rationality. Cotgrove [1992: 1101 and Paehlke [1989: 190] have both (independently) analysed the uncoupling of two dichotomies: the left/radical versus conservative politics and ideologies run no longer parallel to the dichotomy on green and anti-green positions. More recently this argument has been echoed by, among others, Giddens [1994]. While in the early 1970s being green usually meant propagating radical and left politics and ideologies, this is no longer automatically the case from the mid-1980s onward according to Paehlke and Cotgrove. Ecological Modernisation Theory has extended this analytical observation about the domains of politics and culture/ideology to that of economy, of actual activities of production and consumption. The environment becomes relatively independent (now from the economy), ultimately having as a consequence that a capitalist or rather market-based system of production and consumption does not necessarily contradict significant environmental improvements and reforms in any fundamental way. More production and consumption in economic terms (GNP, purchase power, employment) do not have to imply more environmental devastation (pollution, energy use, loss of biodiversity) [cf. Mol, 1995; Spaargaren, 1997]. Within principally the same modern institutional lay-out (a market economy, an industrial system, modern science and technology, a system of welfare states, etc.) we can thus look for - and design - radical environmental reforms. Although the principal institutional lay-out will not change beyond recognition, power relations, pricing, priorities in R&D, investment patterns, and physical planning - to name but a few - will alter significantly following radical environmental reform. In the end, the empirical question will of course remain whether these radical environmental reforms will be sufficient to deal with the - to a large extent socially constructed - criterion of sustainability. Putting Radical Ecology into Practice: 'State of Being' versus 'Code of Conduct' The counter-positioning of an eco-centric and a techno-centric worldview had its mobilising effects in the early 1970s. In the birth period of modern environmentalism, this newly emerging ideology found itself confronted with a dominant world-view and a mode of production and consumption in which there was no role to play for environmental considerations. In order to establish itself as a counter-ideology, environmentalism/ecologism was more or less forced to focus on a limited set of issues which had the best mobilising potential and which were regarded as the most central elements of the emerging environmental ideology. The question of putting these fundamental principles into practice was either postponed or resolved by adhering to a personal political or communal commitment and a green lifestyle, with the latter aimed more at expressing new environmental values rather than final improvements in society's environmental performance. This diagnosis of the situation during the early seventies and the environmentalists' answers to it looks very familiar to us, but is it still relevant for the state of affairs a quarter-century later? If we are to believe Andrew Dobson and others, the situation early members of the environmental movement were confronted with, is still largely relevant today. The political practice of contemporary modern society offers few or no points of reference for a deep or radical green political ideology, and the points of entry within the socio-economic sphere are still difficult to discern. In sum, there still are very few possibilities for developing 'dark green' principles into a 'code of conduct' within politics or business. This is why, according to Dobson, it would be better if we accepted the fact that radical ecologism only lends itself to be expressed in a certain state of mind, a kind of contemplative

(critical) reflection on reality as it is [Dobson, 1990: 47-63]. In short, the attitude that fits ecological radicalism best is a certain 'state of being' which cannot and should not be translated in a direct way into a 'code of conduct'. Ecological Modernisation Theory diverts from such an analysis on two main points. First, radical ecologism underestimates the current environment-induced transformations in social practices and institutional developments in especially industrialised societies. The penetration of environmental considerations into the board rooms of the major political and economic organisations, their nestling on the agendas and their impact on the performance of these organisations and institutions can no longer be analytically neglected, although it can still be criticised as being 'too little, too late'. But the fact that environmental considerations are increasingly institutionalised, and no longer wither away with the first economic depression or crisis, gives radical environmentalists a point of entry to the traditional and dominant institutions and organisations that 'rule the capitalist world-economy'. This observation increasingly resonates in the daily practices of established environmental non-governmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation. Second, the separation of a 'state of being' from a 'code of conduct' paves the way for a radical but rather noncommittal attitude, that combines 'politically correct' contemplations with environmental destructive productive and consumptive activities. Ecological Modernisation Theory deliberately emphasises the close relationship between analysis and criticism of the current state of affairs on the one side and actual transformations and designs of institutions and social practices on the other. Some critics have argued that this has the risk of becoming too 'narrow-minded', becoming caught too much in the present situation without having the possibility of exploring options beyond the existing and dominant societal paradigms. Although there exists a tension between building on existing structures and patterns of action on the one hand and the final desired 'state of being' on the other, the opening up of windows for 'realistic utopian models for the future' [Giddens, 1990; emphasis added] seems a better alternative than either the noncommittal attitudes towards radical ecologism of both postmodernists and radical eco-centrists, or the business as usual scenarios of the mainstream neo-liberal political and economic elites.

Cap root cause arguments ask the wrong question—the only issue is *greater sustainability, not absolute.*

Nicholas **LOW** Architecture @ Melbourne **‘2** “Ecosocialisation and environmental planning” *Environment and Planning A*: 34 p. 57-58

Sustainability is a global, urban project. The question 'is capitalism sustainable?' is the wrong question. Capitalism can take many forms, including some that would not today be recognised by capitalists as 'capitalist' but which yet incorporate some form of market system. Would the committed liberal of the mid-19th century have recognised the economic structures created after the Second World War as a 'free market society'? Schumpeter is no doubt right when he says that capitalism is in constant evolution. But that evolution takes place in a society which is itself in evolution under its own political dynamics whose framework shapes the nature of the economy. Both society and economy are subject to ecological conditions. It is doubtful if there can be widespread prosperity in the world without a free market trading globally. Equally, prosperity will not be widely shared not ecological conservation achieved without **strong positive intervention by governments.** In order to allow nation-states to intervene effectively, **the legitimacy of global governance in laying down a structure of rules for the operation of markets will have to be strengthened** through cosmopolitical democracy.

Environment

Case Outweighs - Environment

Prioritize environmental existence over framing and ontology.

Paul **WAPNER** Prf. And Director of the Global Environmental Policy Program @ American **3**
“Leftist Criticism of ‘Nature’” *Dissent* Winter p. 74-75

The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of “nature” *does* deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions—except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world—in all its diverse embodiments—must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean- François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its “incredulity toward meta-narratives.” Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme “other”; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the “other.” At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the “other” actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment. Now, what does this mean for politics and policy, and the future of the environmental movement? Society is constantly being asked to address questions of environmental quality for which there are no easy answers. As we wrestle with challenges of global climate change, ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, and so forth, we need to consider the economic, political, cultural, and aesthetic values at stake. These considerations have traditionally marked the politics of environmental protection. A sensitivity to eco-criticism requires that we go further and include an ethic of otherness in our deliberations. That is, we need

to be moved by our concern to make room for the “other” and hence fold a commitment to the nonhuman world into our policy discussions. I don’t mean that this argument should drive all our actions or that respect for the “other” should always carry the day. But it must be a central part of our reflections and calculations. For example, as we estimate the number of people that a certain area can sustain, consider what to do about climate change, debate restrictions on ocean fishing, or otherwise assess the effects of a particular course of action, we must think about the lives of other creatures on the earth—and also the continued existence of the nonliving physical world. We must do so not because we wish to maintain what is “natural” but because we wish to act in a morally respectable manner. I have been using postmodern cultural criticism against itself. Yes, the postmodernists are right: we can do what we want with the nonhuman world. There is nothing essential about the realm of rocks, trees, fish, and climate that calls for a certain type of action. But postmodernists are also right that the only ethical way to act in a world that is socially constructed is to respect the voices of the others— of those with whom we share the planet but with whom we may not share a common language or outlook. There is, in other words, a limit or guiding principle to our actions. As political theorist Leslie Thiele puts it, **“One can’t argue for the diversity of views of ‘nature’ without taking a stand for the diversity of nature.”**

Timeframe of solvency is the key issue: Administrative environmental discourse is key to the effectiveness of short-term policy.

Jenneth **PARKER** Co-Director of the MSc in Environmental and Developmental Education @ South Bank Univ. **3** in *Realism Discourse and Deconstruction* eds. Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts p. 82

In this way the social action represented by 'Green Romanticism' is of a more semiotic nature than is the social action represented by 'Administrative rationalism' which has more immediate concrete outcomes in terms of policies and material practices. 'these discourses may actually be complementary when seen from the perspective of a diverse and wide- ranging movement, which seeks to raise issues and effect social change in a variety of different ways. One key consideration is the time-frame in which discourses seek to operate. If you seek to gain short-term results, you will need a discourse that is clearly related to dominant discourses; less so for medium-term results; and long-term results may require the subversion of the dominant discourse itself in conjunction with changing certain key social structures and material practices. I would argue that effective movements typically work with all these time-scales in addition to working at different scales from micro to macro politics.

AT: K Prior

Ocean policy debate is a productive political imaginary—the plan is a prerequisite for effective critique.

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<http://www.lib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/pubfiles/adt-MU20080523.120432/02Whole.pdf> p. 175-178

Forms of deliberation - practitioners interpretations The political epistemology I have described in this Chapter, primarily through the work of Latour, does not make claims about the value of oceans, the ways humans are estranged from the oceans, or how to reconcile our estrangement from oceans. The process described would promote the performance of oceans on alternative grounds through an imaginative exchange of views, knowledge, ideas and understandings. At this point I want to mention some of the forms of deliberation that might facilitate the performative dimension of the collective with a practitioners sensibility. To provide this level of elaboration the work of Innes and Booher offer valuable insights: People all over the world are experimenting with consensus building to deal with complex, controversial public issues, changing contexts, and uncertain futures in an institutionally and politically fragmented society . . . Processes range in size from a handful of participants to hundreds organized into interlocking committees and task forces, each working on different aspects of complex questions. (1999, 10) Innes and Booher define consensus building as: a process that is truly facilitated, as opposed to merely chaired . . . The processes use special meeting management techniques that allow participants to be heard and be informed, and encourage discussion that is both respectful and open-ended. The techniques discourage the taking of positions . . . Assumptions and constraints are not taken for granted, but explored. (1999, 10) Consensus building can be brought about through role-playing games and bricolage, even when situations appear subject to intractable disputes. Innes and Booher write: role playing . . . allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas from creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders interests more clearly. (1999, 11) With respect to bricolage, Innes and Booher explain: participants play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs . . . Bricolage . . . produces . . . a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table from the outset. The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense empowers individuals. (1999, 11) The processes of role-playing and bricolage are transformative: "they change the players, what they know, and what they are likely to do" (Innes & Booher 1999, 11).¹² They facilitate what Schechner describes in his theory of performance as a "collective reflexivity" where understandings, including the assumptions and preconceptions they embody, are clarified, contested and reshaped (cited in Healy 2003, 99). The reflexive character of these forms of deliberation "result in the articulation of relations between people and things that, in ANT terms, perform the environment along changed lines" (Healy 2003, 100). Conclusion In this Chapter I have navigated a course through ocean realism and constructivism to find a way of imagining oceans as a co-creation between humans and oceans. I suggest that in the task of envisaging nature as a co-creation, a performative notion of nature is useful because it does not conceive of humans and non-humans as prefigured categories but as emerging and shifting within networks of relations (as we find in ANT theory). I have provided an overview and critique of three approaches to ocean ethics and politics - a sea ethic based on Leopold's Land Ethic, marine stewardship and environmental pragmatism. I

suggest all three approaches have their strengths but in terms of my concerns in this dissertation with the agency of oceans, they do not address these concerns or deal with them adequately. In setting out Latour's political epistemology, I highlight that his approach specifically addresses and facilitates non-human agency in a democratic process. Latour's collective procedure provides a useful model for facilitating both multifaceted engagement in decision-making and critical enquiry about oceans policy inclusive of non-humans. Latour's procedure importantly sets the stage for the performance of oceans. Role-playing and bricolage are discussed as examples of reflexive forms of deliberation that help to perform ocean environments along new lines. In conclusion, the argument of this chapter supports the second part of my thesis statement that improving the prospects for just ocean existences can be achieved through the use of politically generated knowledges about oceans to shift policy towards social-environmental goals that are not widely imagined by the Western subject.

Representations and framework aren't a prior issue—arguments for better policy should draw from different frameworks when appropriate.

Andrew **LIGHT** Environmental Philosophy @ NYU **‘S** “What is Pragmatic Philosophy”
<http://faculty.washington.edu/alight/papers/Light.What%20Pragmatic.pdf>. P. 349-351

I have no easy answer to this question of how practical or “do-able” reform proposals made by philosophers should be. As suggested above, it is a question that has obvious important implications for the application of philosophical principles to environmental policy. My intuition though is that the pragmatist ought to have a long-term end in view while at the same time she must have at the ready viable alternatives which assume current political or economic systems and structures whenever possible. This is not to say that the pragmatic philosopher gives up on the tasks of defending alternatives to current structures, and the pursuit of those alternatives in democratic debates on the reallocation of resources. It only means that our position may require, for consistency sake to our pragmatic intentions at least, that we not rely exclusively on such changes in articulating our preferred ends for better public policies. In this context, there are at least two senses in which one could understand the meaning of “pragmatic” philosophy as discussed so far. (1) Philosophy that has practical intent, anchored to practical problems, and (2) Philosophy which aids in the development of policy solutions that can actually achieve support and consensus. While Young’s approach certainly encompasses (1) the question is whether she also does (2). My own pragmatist approach assumes that there is a connection between (1) and (2) (indeed, that (1) implies (2)). Assuming a successful argument that (1) and (2) are related in this way (for some this may take some argument, for others it will be obvious) then a question remains concerning how to go about achieving (2). Let me make just one suggestion for how the pragmatist could go about reconciling her desire to change systems with the need to make achievable policy recommendations. As is suggested by my approach, my view is that if a pragmatic philosophy in the end is in the service of an argument to create better policies, then in our democratic society it must be prepared to argue its case before the public, and perhaps sometimes only before policy makers. As Said puts it, the public intellectual not only wants to express her beliefs but also wants to persuade others—meaning the public at large—of her views (1994, p. 12). This raises the critical issue of how such appeals to the public are to be made. It raises the issue of how important persuasion is to the creation of pragmatic arguments. All philosophy is in some sense about persuasion, though to differentiate ourselves from rhetoricians (if we are interested in making such distinctions, which I still am) we must restrict ourselves to persuasion through some form of argument given more or less agreed upon (and revisable) standards for what counts as a good argument. But the pragmatic philosopher is not simply concerned with per- suading other philosophers. She is also interested in persuading the public either directly (in hopes that they will in turn influence policy makers) or indirectly, by appealing to policy makers who in turn help to shape public opinion. The work of a public philosophy is not solely for intramural philosophical discussion; it is aimed at larger forums. But as I suggested before, such a task requires some attention to the question of what motivates either the public, policy makers, or both to act. Our bar is set higher than traditional philosophical standards of validity and abstractly conceived soundness. For if we are to direct our philosophy at policies in a context other than a hypothetical philosophical framework, we must also make arguments which will motivate our audiences to act. Since we are dealing in ethi- cal and political matters, the question for pragmatic philosophers like

Young and myself is how much we must attend to the issue of moral motivation in forming our pragmatic arguments. If we agree that the issue of moral motivation is always crucial for a pragmatic philosophy then at least two issues arise. First, as I suggested before, we must be prepared to embrace a theoretical or conceptual pluralism which allows us to pick and choose from a range of conceptual frameworks in making our arguments without committing to the theoretical monism which may be assumed in some versions of these frameworks. The reason is that we need to be able to make arguments that will appeal to the conceptual frameworks of our audiences while recognizing that these frameworks can change from audience to audience. So, if we think a utilitarian argument will be useful for talking to economists in decision making positions, then we should be allowed to engage such a framework without completely committing ourselves to utilitarianism.

Prioritize climate problem-solving. The case is a pre-requisite for discursive shifts on energy use and environmental harm.

Paul **WAPNER** Director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in the School of International Service at American University ⁸ “The Importance of Critical Environmental Studies in the New Environmentalism” *Global Environmental Politics* 8.1 p. MUSE 6-13

We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life [End Page 9] formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don't change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.⁴ Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.⁵ Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on significant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.⁶ Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the face of such a predicament? Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward. This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn't like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn't like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline. Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now—when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical theory. We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or,

put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. [End Page 10] Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy, problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policy-relevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility. For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language. As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only the best and brightest can understand. Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problem-solving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences. In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order. While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially self-evident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators. We need to find metaphors, [End Page 11] analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times. Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless, it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals, (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a "critical" role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies

can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism—specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation.

Pragmatic, limited correction of our epistemology by testing *environmental* solutions is better than trying fullscale epistemological or ontological shift. They stop us from developing *better* forms of management.

Bryan **NORTON** Philosophy @ Georgia Tech '2 in *Pragmatist Ethics for a Technological Culture* ed. Keulartz p. 179-182

The positivist sociologist, Otto Neurath, provided a useful simile - one that has become very popular with pragmatists today - that illustrates the pragmatist search for truth (discussed in Quine, 1960). Improving our knowledge and understanding, Neurath said, is most like repairing a ship while on the high seas. Imagine a ship that is kept in service indefinitely, with no opportunity to be pulled into dry dock for repairs, As particular planks weaken from weather and heavy use, we replace them, standing on the strongest remaining planks while replacing the weakest ones. In principle, it would be possible to replace every plank, resulting in a "new" ship in the physical sense that every plank is new, but the "ship" remains itself, with no need to be re-christened. The analogy captures perfectly the pragmatists' approach to epistemology. First, the pursuit of epistemological renewal - for the pragmatists, unlike Descartes - does not start by tearing down every plank of knowledge, necessitating a completely new construction. Rather the task of renewal begins for pragmatists by identifying the most problematic "planks" of knowledge. Since we must keep the boat afloat as we do our repairs identifying the problematic planks is not just a matter of identifying what beliefs we have the least evidence for. In the ship analogy, this might mean that we fix a moderately rotted plank below the water level before replacing a badly rotted one in a little-used area of the deck; in pragmatist epistemology, this kind of decision involves identifying uncertainties that are particularly relevant to community survival and to other chosen social goals. The assessment is furthermore relative to appropriate values, not simply to a mechanical application of a test of physical strength of the particular "planks" of knowledge. The analogy also illustrates the idea of piecemeal improvement of a belief system in which no belief is ultimately privileged, even though some beliefs are accepted, in context, as unquestioned for very long periods of time. So the analogy, by noting that the entire ship is subject to the ravages of time and wear, and will eventually be replaced with new wood, illustrates also the pragmatists' idea that every belief is up for re-evaluation as necessary. If we imagine our sailors continuing their back and forth passages indefinitely, each and every belief will eventually be submitted to the test of experience and experiment. Its time will come when it is relevant to an important disagreement regarding what needs to be done and how it must be done. Each plank of knowledge will thus eventually be re-evaluated and its strength at any given point will be the extent to which it has held up to observation and experiential tests in past cases in which it was called into question.

The ship analogy also illustrates in simple terms a way out of the quandaries of subjectivism, anti-realism, and relativism. Some readers, reasoning as follows, might think that Neurath's analogy pushes us closer to relativism. Since the decision which 'plank to stand on and which to fix is a matter of judgment, surely affected by the - and values of the one (survival, at least), it might be argued that different people, including different scientists, will take different things to be "given" and unquestioned at any particular time. Accepting that our society is made up of people with different values and different assumptions - paradigms and worldviews - it could be argued that we must expect different people with different perspectives to "have" different goals, values, and to

put different scientific hypotheses up for t. Not only will people cite very different beliefs in support of policy choices, communication across perspectives may become impossible, because the choice of linguistic categories and meanings depends also on individual's values and This undermines appeals to any particular linguistic vocabulary as privileged. as valid pre-experientially (Quint, 1961) we must give up, as Dewey saw, appeals to fixed and eternal categories and to fixed and eternal truths The ways in which we identify, characterize, individuate, and aggregate objects of the senses are deeply affected by our goals and values as well as our perspective and worldview. Through language, we construct reality; and different languages reflect, it would seem, different worlds inhabited by different truths from different perspectives. If we apply Neurath's analogy to language, we find that a kind of linguistic relativity - perhaps better called, linguistic conventionalism- is unavoidable. Despite this form of conventionalism, which plays havoc with our ability to match specific sentences with particular bits of reality, there is still an element of realism in Neurath's AM. The - analogy avoids a skeptical and relativist conclusion about beliefs and knowledge, because the decisions made do not escape the test of experience. Over time, staying afloat depends on **realistic assessments of damage to the ship and realistic models of what will happen if a particular plank fails.** If the repair crew constantly repairs the easiest planks to access, ignoring the ones under deep water, a disaster will eventually occur. Similarly, if the crew replaces the bar in the Officers' galley every time it is scratched, while ignoring severe rot below the water line, the whole crew will be selected out of the pool of sailors and a new ship will have to be launched. Further, while languages may suggest different and relative ontologies for individuals who speak different languages, language is not an individual matter. Just as the repair crew on the ship must communicate if they are to collectively decide what to do next, a seeker after the truth will be a member of an intellectual community. Some form of shared language or linguistic communication is presupposed in the designation of a group as a 'community. Similarly, - as the repair crew's decisions will affect the whole crew, giving crew members an incentive to oversee the repairmen's decisions and work, the progression of the scientific endeavor will bring larger and larger communities - and their collective and individual experiences - into discourse about what to do to protect the environment. The key point here is that Neurath's analogy shows clearly how we can adopt a position of limited realism by pushing the level at which we judge truth and falsity from the sentential level to the action level at which we act on our total belief system in particular situations. We can recognize, in the face of unexpected experiences and surprising outcomes of experiments, that our set of beliefs is inadequate; we cannot, however, on the basis of one or a few such experiences, unambiguously identify where the problem in our belief system lies, and there is no algorithm for deciding the best way to repair problems as they arise. Because, in any given situation, what we expect is determined not simply by one or a few beliefs our expectations are supported by our entire system of beliefs, including background knowledge, that is (temporarily) not doubted in the given situation. If expectations are not born out by experience, a solution requires a creative reconstruction (Quine, 1960). Direct experience, to extend Neurath's analogy, can tell us that we have a leak" in our system of knowledge. Determining how best to fix the leak may require that we reconsider some of our background beliefs. Limited realism accepts the fact that no substantive knowledge of the external world is knowable a priori; we must correct our system of beliefs without benefit of prior principles to guide us. It also accepts the apparently unavoidable conclusion that our varied linguistic forms, designed to function in many different situations, yield no common underlying structure for all experience. If categories we find in the world are of our own making; they are not given in reality independent of us For these reasons realism must be limited. But it remains realism in the one important sense. It retains a method of selection and is thus self-correcting on the basis of broader experience and open deliberation. One cannot believe anything one wishes and still survive -this is a necessity imposed upon us by our environment; it is not volitional, it is imposed upon us. The crew on Neurath's ship either stays afloat or they die. For the pragmatist, it is not so important to separate the hypotheses acted

upon from the attitudes and values that bring them to the fore in real situations requiring inquiry; what is important is that we observe and experiment, that there be an external check on claims and counterclaims. There is, after all, an experience that will tell the repair crew they made a mistake, given their shared goals. The experience begins with the sensation of sinking into wetness. The action contexts, and certain unavoidable experiences, correct us when we have wrong beliefs and inappropriate goals. Adaptive Managers can thus adopt limited realism as a working epistemology. Since environmental management is clearly a cultural and social endeavor, it can be hoped that (a) many belief systems, perspectives, and viewpoints will be proposed and tried out, but that (b) this initial relativity will be gradually reduced as proposals, the belief systems that =MM them, and even the perspectives taken, are subjected to the ultimate test: do they work in real situations? Hopefully, as time goes on, we can learn new methods and techniques whereby proposals and beliefs can be tested through pilot projects, experiments, and so forth, **avoiding the necessity of having a cultural collapse to disprove every errant hypothesis.** This hope is represented, in pragmatist thought, in the emphasis pragmatists place on devising techniques and methods that help to winnow truth from falsehood without catastrophic cultural failure. If indeed such methods can be devised and gradually improved, it would appear that the optimism of Adaptive Managers - who, we admitted at the outset, must have some reason to believe that observation and experiment will provide some advantage in an open-ended process of environmental management - are provided intellectual support by a pragmatist epistemology. Our excursion into limited new and pragmatist epistemology suggests that, given many diverse voices engaged in dialogue about what we ought to do to protect the environment, a general method emerging from our activity. The method can, at its best, help us to pick winning from losing strategies by use of studies, observations, and experiments, and a diligent recording of what works and what doesn't work in particular situations. There is thus reason to believe that Adaptive Management can provide a self-corrective method for pursuing environmental protection.

AT: Reduce Consumption/Growth Ks

Alternative can't solve—relying on a value shift to less consumption can't prevent climate change—others will consume even if large parts of the population adopt a sufficiency lifestyle.

Blake **ALCOTT** Ecological Economist Masters from Cambridge in Land Economy '8 The sufficiency strategy: Would rich-world frugality lower environmental impact? *Ecological Economics* 64 (4) p. Science Direct

The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its attractiveness increasing along with awareness that not much can be done to stem population growth and that energy-efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire, part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility, effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can be drawn. • The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift – price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound – are not yet part of mainstream discussion. • Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the frugality shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction in world aggregate consumption or impact: Poorer marginal consumers increase their consumption. • The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question. • The concepts of 'North' and 'South' are not relevant to the consumption discussion. • Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts by the rich would effect some lowering of total world consumption, changing human behaviour through argument and exhortation is exceedingly difficult. • While our moral concern for present others is stronger than that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no way incompatible with non-sustainable impact. • Since savings effected by any one country or individual can be (more than) compensated by other countries and individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world. • No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in $I = f(P, A, T)$ guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever. • Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually complicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political left-side strategies directly lowering impact. • Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to directly lower impact both in terms of depletion and emissions. Lower consumption may have advantages on the individual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling the Kantian criterion that one's acts should be possible universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air, less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space. And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or to buy goods such as petrol and cars. However, given global markets and marginal consumers, one person's doing without enables another to 'do with': In the near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person can get fully replaced. And given the extent of poverty and the temptations of luxury and prestige consumption, this near run is likely to be longer than the time horizon required for a relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital species and natural resources.

Case is a pre-requisite to changes in the direction of consumption. Without growth and minimizing conflict resources get devoted to competition.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund '9 "A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability" *Env't Science and Policy* 12 p. 190-191

Though these caricatures may still hold true to a certain extent, I would argue that the last years have challenged this impasse. On one hand, the general public has grown increasingly aware of how serious our current predicament has become. On the other hand, a string of promising

academic work, both in the sciences (Hoffert et al., 2002) and in green political theory (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007), has finally taken up what otherwise has been a dormant position ever since the 1970s. I am referring to those who accept the gravity of the present environmental crisis yet believe that the solution can never be found in the traditional green mantra of **reduction**, conservation and **self-denial**. Instead these authors have attempted to **reconcile** the politics of **scarcity** with **technological optimism**, to tap into the spirit that once made grand projects like the Apollo program possible and, on this basis, move towards a politics of radical engagement. Nowhere does the need for such new politics appear more urgent than on the global level. With parts of the world (mostly in Asia) rapidly industrializing while others remaining trapped in the direst poverty, the planetary perspective goes to the heart of the sustainable transition. Not only does it show the terrible human cost of the present status-quo but also the irreversibility in the move towards modernization. Billions are now impatiently aspiring for the material living standard of the West, and given the limited ecological space of the planet (Andreasson, 2005; Rist, 1997, pp. 44–45), it is hard to see how these needs can be met without radical technological innovation. However, there are reasons to doubt the feasibility of any advanced technological paths to sustainability. Only in a climate of high and **sustained economic growth** would it be possible for states to set aside the vast resources necessary to bring success to long-term projects on nuclear fusion, nanotechnology and other converging technologies (Malsch, 2008). Such benign economic conditions are, just as the prospects of sustainable development more generally (Blinck et al., 2007), unlikely to come about in times of international tension, unplanned mass-migration and growing resource scarcity. This should warrant a new kind of sobering realism, an acceptance that the future of modernity is now a planetary enterprise and that we are all into this as one common human civilization.

Reducing consumption worst for billions dependent on high levels of global demand. It's too complicated to reduce consumption without economic disaster.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund '9 "A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability" *Env't Science and Policy* 12 p. 191

Yet, this does not take away the impression that other environmental problems, and then especially global climate change, are not prone to go away that easily. In fact, climate change may turn out to be the "perfect moral storm" (Gardiner, 2006) as its causes and effects are transboundary, intergenerational and highly varied across time and space. Unlike CFCs that were fairly easy to substitute, the use of carbon based fuels are ubiquitous, even up to the point when it can be considered the very propellant of the modern industrial civilization. This combination of immense collective action problems (Andreou, 2006) and our profound dependence of fossil fuels clearly put limits on traditional green politics. Yet, it also helps explaining why Greens, during the last decade, so unanimously have identified climate change as being the environmental issue. For radical Greens, the transition to a post-carbon society means nothing less than the very dismantling of the global consumer society, a return to small self-sufficient communities and with them a life thought to be both more democratic and authentic. For moderate Greens, the same transition is a way of not only avoiding dangerous climate change but also indirectly solving a range of other environmental problems such as acidification and toxification since these often are closely related to the burning of fossil fuels. Both groups offer grim projections of what the future will be like if we fail to take action (Kolbert, 2006; Linden, 2006; Lynas, 2007). The coming catastrophes of climate change are thought to include economic downfall, lethal heat waves and

massive loss of human life. What is perplexing is that many, if not all, of these future calamities are already happening today in Africa and other parts of the developing world. Given that most environmental ethicists subscribe to highly universalistic morals this may point towards a kind of cognitive dissonance by which potential human suffering in the future appears more urgent than actual human suffering today. But beyond that dissonance, and the accompanying easy rhetorical point, lies a much darker landscape of hopelessness. Without the prospect of advanced technological paths to sustainability, and here we have to remember that Greens traditionally have been highly sceptical of big science, the sustainable transition would have to imply a dramatic reduction in human consumption and thus in global economic demand. To put it somewhat bluntly, “the path of reconciliation with the Third World might consist in our becoming Third World ourselves” (Bahro, 1996, p. 88). Taking this provocative statement as a starting point, I will now turn my attention to three different problems related to the anatomy of such a possible future reduction.

2.1. Unintended consequences Witnessing how the subprime mortgage fallout has spread around the world over the last year, it is easy to see that not only is the world economic system highly interdependent, its foundations may also be somewhat shakier than commonly understood. The very capitalistic system as we know it (with stock markets, interest rates and government treasury bonds) is built around the single premise of long-term economic growth. Any politically motivated reduction in consumption, especially of the more dramatic kind envisaged by radical Greens, is likely to have numerous and probably even **disastrous consequences** for the world economy. Unfair as the current terms of trade may be, the **livelihood of billions of people** depend on that there is a **global demand** for textiles, food and a whole range of other consumer goods. Only if very carefully orchestrated can that demand be scaled back piece by piece, yet Arne Næss is not alone in arguing, “the longer we wait the more drastic will be the measures needed” (Næss, 1989, p. 31). Most likely, any such urgency would come at a high human toll. Remembering how notoriously difficult it was to plan the economy from above in the communist countries (Ericson, 2006), dismantling global chains of commerce appears to be like a gigantic Mikado game in which we cannot easily tell what should go first. It is not certain that what appears as the luxury of some is not intricately connected to the provision of the daily bread of others.

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For radical Greens, the transition to a post-carbon society means nothing less than the very dismantling of the global consumer society, a return to small self-sufficient communities and with them a life thought to be both more democratic and authentic. For moderate Greens, the same transition is a way of not only avoiding dangerous climate change but also indirectly solving a range of other environmental problems such as acidification and toxification since these often are closely related to the burning of fossil fuels. Both groups offer grim projections of what the future will be like if we fail to take action (Kolbert, 2006; Linden, 2006; Lynas, 2007). The coming catastrophes of climate change are thought to include economic downfall, lethal heat waves and massive loss of human life. What is perplexing is that many, if not all, of these future calamities are already happening today in Africa and other parts of the developing world. Given that most environmental ethicists subscribe to highly universalistic morals this may point towards a kind of cognitive dissonance by which potential human suffering in the future appears more urgent than actual human suffering today. But beyond that dissonance, and the accompanying easy rhetorical point, lies a much darker landscape of hopelessness. Without the prospect of advanced technological paths to sustainability, and here we have to remember that Greens traditionally have been highly sceptical of big science, the sustainable transition would have to imply a dramatic reduction in human consumption and thus in global economic demand. To put it somewhat bluntly, “the path of reconciliation with the Third World might consist in our becoming Third World ourselves” (Bahro, 1996, p. 88). Taking this provocative statement as a starting point, I will now turn my attention to three different problems related to the anatomy of such a possible future reduction.

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Their kritik of consumption asks the wrong question—the plan shifts *both production and consumption.* the focus shouldn’t be on reducing production or consumption but changing inputs.

Arthur **MOL** Environmental Sociology @ Wageningen **AND** Gert **SPAARGAREN** Globus Inst. @ Tilburg **4** “EcologicalModernization andConsumption: A Reply” *Society and Natural Resources* 17 p. 262-263

In his article “Ecological Modernization: What About Consumption?” Michael Carolan argues that the emerging ecological modernization school of thought deals inadequately with issues of consumption. Many of his arguments are not unique and resound in other publications as well (e.g., During 1992; recently

Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002). As we read the criticism, the inadequacy of ecological modernization ideas with respect to consumption is believed to be as follows: 1. Ecological modernization is preoccupied with production and only asks for more production as a strategy for solving the environmental crisis. 2. Ecological modernization hardly pays conceptual and empirical attention to consumption. 3. If ecological modernization pays attention to consumption, it neglects questions of overconsumption and is too optimistic about the capacities of consumers as knowledgeable agents. Beyond Malthusianism: The Irrelevance of “More” or “Less” In the debates on ecological modernization assumptions and arguments, one of the most persistent misunderstandings consists of the claim that ecological modernization is asking for more production in order to lead us out of the environmental crisis. In his article, Carolan not only repeats this misreading but subsequently makes it into one of his central critiques. However, among the core tenets of ecological modernization theory there has never been a call for more production.¹ Closest to this claim comes the ecological modernization idea that an unqualified plea to limit the growth of production and consumption as the only “real” answer to the ecological crisis tends to miss the point. **The question of more or less production and consumption is the wrong question**, as far as ecological modernization scholars are concerned. The focal point should be on the environmental dimensions and performance of production processes, the goods and services they generate and the consumption practices they help constitute, and this performance cannot be sufficiently understood or addressed by taking into account only or primarily the (physical and economic) quantities involved. Ecological modernization focuses on the changing character of production and consumption, as they tend to become organized not only with the use of economic criteria of quantity, but also and equally so using ecological criteria of quality. According to ecological modernization scholars, this reorganization can only be realized by moving further into the modernization process and when making use of modern institutions like markets and democratic pluralism—hence ecological modernization. Modern technology and industry can indeed be very helpful in this respect, but nowhere in the ecological modernization literature is the emphasis on the important roles for industry and technology stated or reformulated in terms of a claim for more production and more industry, nor cast in the rather obfuscating terminology of “more-as-different” as used by Carolan. At various places selective contraction (e.g., of nuclear industry, of pesticides production, of fossil fuel production) and shifts to other products and social practices (the use of public transport instead of private cars) are argued for, in order to stay within sustainability boundaries. In that sense, the objective of eco-efficiency is never an eco-efficiency as such or in itself. It does not make much sense to argue for production (nuclear technology) or products (sport utility vehicles, SUVs) just to be eco-efficient. Ecoefficiency, factor 4 or 10, closing loops, energy extensivisation, and many similar strategies are part and parcel of a more encompassing program to organize modern production and consumption within sustainability boundaries, no matter how difficult it might turn out to be to identify these boundaries in an undisputed way. The second problem in Carolan’s arguments against more production is his use of natural science “empirical facts” and mathematical projections. While the author himself points to the need to be cautious when using natural science empirical projections to criticize social theories, he nevertheless takes a limited amount of specific facts, adds a number of hypotheses and arbitrary projections to them, and uses this procedure to prove that we will have too much production and consumption in the future. Hence, the question of how much is enough (or ecologically possible), becomes essential (again). However, anyone familiar with standing debates in the environmental field (from the classic debates of Simon vs. Ehrlich up to the present dispute between Lomborg and some IPCC experts) knows that such empirical arguments can easily be contrasted with countervailing “evidence” proving just the opposite. This use of “isolated” facts and argument does not move us forward. Of course, social theories need to be confronted with empirical evidence and counterevidence, but then in an appropriate and sophisticated way and not by mentioning a few facts and extrapolating these in a Malthusian way.

Climate

AT: Climate Representation/Apocalypse

Scientific data and large-scale impacts are key to a successful environmental frame. Alternative alone fails—empirically proven it can't persuade the public.

Fredrick **BUTTEL** Rural Sociology @ Wisconsin '97 in *Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring* eds. David Goodman and Michael Watts p. 353-355

It is useful to begin with the observation that, in an ultimate sense, there is actually no such thing as a sustainable agriculture movement. By this I mean that despite the range of possible appeals for achieving a greater degree of agricultural sustainability, there is no one underlying notion or strategy that can serve as a singular unifying focus for the movement. This observation has two important implications. First, we need to understand the diversity among agricultural sustainability movements. Many treatments of environmentalism and related movements such as agricultural sustainability tend to exaggerate these movements' coherence and thereby miss the fact that the roles they can play are highly situational. The diversity of environmental motivations and ideologies is nowhere better demonstrated than with respect to agriculture. Second, it is essential to appreciate that it will only be through coalitions - of sustainable agriculture movements, and of these movements with others with which they have shared concerns - that this social movement force can achieve the extent of meaningful impacts that are required to address fundamental agro-ecological sustainability problems. Table 14.1 presents a typology of environmental claims, ideologies, and discourses and provides examples of how they have been brought to bear on agriculture." The four-fold typology is constituted by two generic dilemmas of modern environmentalism. One dimension is that of re-rationalism versus anti-rationalism (Murphy 1994). As Scott (1990) has noted, the underlying motivation, or source of identity, of many environmental groups is a notion that the rationalisation/modernisation dynamic of industrial capitalist societies, undergirded by the rationality of modern science while beset by the irrationalities wrought by technology, brings the risk of large-scale ecological disruption or disaster. There is a strong feeling that science must be brought under social control and that the instrumental, dehumanising rationality of industrialisation, rampant consumerism, and competitive social relations must be tempered if not terminated. This orientation may thus be termed 'anti-rationalist'. But as Yearley (1991) has stressed, as much as this anti-rationalist Weltanschauung is deeply held in many environmental circles, it has not tended to be persuasive in the political arena because this discourse is readily delegitimated by the dominant rationalist/modernisation discourse. Environmental groups' public positions have therefore tended to reflect what might be called a 're-rationalist' position - one that seeks to modify industrial-technological rationalism at the margin by use of scientific data and accounting mechanisms, and by appeals to environmental or natural-resource efficiency (see Murphy 1994). The emphasis is thus on balancing the instrumental rationality of industrialisation with another instrumental rationality based on prudent management of the environment and natural capital. The second dilemma of modern environmentalism is that of centralisation versus localism. Decentralisation or localism - and the ideal of harmonious, decentralised communities is typically an integral component of the utopian ideal of much of the environmental community, particularly the more 'expressive' ecology movements discussed by Scott (1990). In other words, 'think globally, act locally'. But as much as this is the ideal for many groups and individuals, decentralist environmentalism also has political liabilities. By operating mainly at a local level, environmentalists would spread their resources too thinly across what is an almost infinite number of environmental policy fora, and thereby have little influence. In actual practice, the dominant organisations of modern environmentalism, such as the 'big ten' in the US, have tended to 'think globally, and act globally'. Global constructions of environmental problems, such as the current notion of global environmental change, can be politically persuasive because they can be based on scientific reasoning and data (e.g. climate science, conservation biology), can create an imagery of imminent world-scale environmental disaster if action is not taken to ameliorate the underlying causes of problems, and create a strong moral justification to override politics-as-usual to do so. Centralised strategies - Earth Summits, international environmental agreements, and influencing the priorities and policies of the World Bank and national development agencies - have come to be of particular importance to the political agenda of the most powerful and influential environmental organisations.

The 1AC is a *challenge* message not a threat message. That increases salience, collective action, and creative problem-solving.

Robert **BRULLE** Sociology & Env't Science @ Drexel '10 "From Environmental Campaigns to Advancing the Public Dialog: Environmental Communication for Civic Engagement"
Environmental Communication 4 (1) p. 92

From Identity to Challenge Campaigns One of the most common assumptions in designing identity-based environmental communication campaigns is that fear appeals are counterproductive. As Swim et al. (2009, p. 80) note: "well meaning attempts to create urgency about climate change by appealing to fear of disasters or health risks frequently lead to the exact opposite of the desired response: denial, paralysis, apathy, or actions that can create greater risks than the one being mitigated." While the author goes on to qualify and expand this line of argument, this has been taken as an absolute in the popular press and much of the grey literature produced by nonprofit organizations and foundations. However, the academic literature portrays a much more complex picture: whereas apocalyptic rhetoric has been shown to be able to evoke powerful feelings of **issue salience** (O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 373), reassuring messages, such as those advocated by ecoAmerica, have the least ability to increase issue salience (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007; Lowe et al., 2006; Meijinders, Cees, Midden, & Wilke, 2001; Witte & Allen, 2000). Additionally, apocalyptic messages do not necessarily result in denial. A number of empirical studies show that individuals respond to threat appeals with an **increased focus** on **collective action** (Eagly & Kulesa, 1997; Langford, 2002; Leiserowitz, Kates, & Parris, 2006, p. 437; Maiteny, 2002; Shaiko, 1999; Swim et al., 2009, p. 94). Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, and Leitten (1993, p. 248) distinguish between threat and **challenge messaging**: threat messages "are those in which the perception of danger exceeds the perception of abilities or resources to cope with the stressor. **Challenge appraisals**, in contrast, are those in which the perception of danger does not exceed the perception of resources or abilities to cope." If a meaningful response to a threat can be taken that is within the resources of the individual, this results in a challenge, which "may galvanize creative ideas and actions in ways that transform and **strengthen** the **resilience** and **creativity** of individuals and communities" (Fritze, Blashki, Burke, & Wieseman, 2008, p. 12). While fear appeals can lead to maladaptive behaviors, fear combined with information about effective actions can also be strongly motivating (O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 376; Witte & Allen, 2000).

Combination of fear and hope avoids eco-authoritarianism.

John **BARRY** Reader Politics @ Queen's University (Belfast) '12 *The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability* p. 230-231

In my view it would be dishonest and disingenuous if it were not acknowledged that green politics is partly based on fear as well: fear of resource scarcity and environmental devastation and the collapse or severe compromising of valued forms of human life based around democratic government, equality, social justice, and so on. The threat of impending catastrophe animates the green movement to greater or lesser extents. 'Hard greens' possessed of an ecorealist bent are not thin on the ground in contemporary political discourse as indicated in the Introduction. Contemporary 'hard greens' such as John Gray (Barry, 2006a) or James Lovelock, or certain

strands of 'eco-primitivism' (Somma, 2009; Zerzan, 1994; Jensen, 2002, 2010; Humphrey, 2009), who sometimes advocate authoritarian solutions, are testament to the vibrancy of this fear-based green politics. And it has to be recalled that early ecological thinkers such as Garrett Hardin, William Ophuls, Robert Heilbroner, and others such as Edward Abbey and Teddy Goldsmith, were also motivated (either reluctantly or enthusiastically) by a sense that non-democratic politics was the only way to either avoid or cope with the impending ecological catastrophe. But this threat does not undermine the republican project, any more than it undermines the liberal project. And overall, while such ecoauthoritarian positions are unrepresentative of the large body of green thinking, they ought to be acknowledged by greens as one strand of ecological political thinking. However, their existence does not undermine the essential democratic and democratizing character of green political thinking (Barry, 1999a). In fact, the crisis of unsustainability may call for more and different forms of democratic politics and participation rather than less of the same, as the eco-authoritarians wrongly hold. It is, of course, also the case that green politics is based on hope and not just fear, and it is one of the main advantages of using the nomenclature of 'green' as opposed to 'environmental' politics is that it explicitly speaks to the nonenvironmental principles of green politics around human rights, democracy, and citizenship and so on (Barry, 2007a). Green politics as a politics of hope and emancipation (Eckersley, 1992) is one which takes a realistic and empirically informed view of the limits and challenges facing human societies and the possibilities for progressive social transformation. That is, the 'fear' that animates green politics should not be viewed as some reactionary Malthusian concern with non-negotiable 'scarcity' (from external nature)-often a standard critique of green politics from the liberal left, based on a historically informed misunderstanding of green politics (Barry, 1999b, 2007a). At the same time, the fear which characterizes green politics should neither be understood as some equally reactionary conservative fear of dangerous and unchangeable features of 'human nature' which are driving us to ecological catastrophe

Climate – AT: Consumption Alt

Changing growth to solve climate change works – radical social change won't.

Manuel Arias-**MALDONADO** Poli Sci @ Malaga '12 *Real Green: Sustainability After the End of Nature* p. 116-120

In principle, public opinion should just rely on science- hence the activity of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as a bridge between science and the public. But then again, we have read Kuhn and Fereyabend: the sociology of scientific knowledge has convinced us that society is inside the laboratory and science can only reflect social priorities and political interests. How can we just rely on science? To some, actually, climatology is not saying the truth about global warming (Leroux 2005). Yet science must still be our **standpoint**, for there is **no better alternative**, even though it is a "post-normal science" whereby "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decision urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993: 742). However, a misunderstanding should be avoided. It is in this context that Sheila Jasanoff (2007) has advocated the need to produce a more humble science, one that leaves room for ethics and renounces the modern dream of a complete control over nature. That is just about right. But the reflective re-shaping of socionatural relations, up to a point where we try to regulate the oscillations of the climate with our actions, is not precisely a humble goal, nor an absurd one, especially since there is **no direct relation** between the current **scientific consensus** and the green radical vision of a **de-industrialised society**. Although action must be taken, it should be a proportionate one. Devising public policies and fostering private behaviour as part of a climate change policy should not be used as a pretext for advancing a closed conception of sustainability. Sustainability must encompass climate change, instead of climate change simply closing up sustainability. I would like to suggest that climate change's social dilemma resembles the one described by Blaise Pascal regarding God's existence. He famously reduced faith to a wager after considering the probabilities at stake. Pascal suggested that, although we cannot prove through reason that God exists, a person should bet on His existence, since living life accordingly one has everything to gain and nothing to lose, whereas, even more crucially, acting otherwise could mean losing everything and gaining eternal damnation (Pascal 1995: 123-5). Likewise, we do know that temperatures are rising, although we do not know how will they evolve in the future, while there exists the possibility that humans are an active agent in that process and they can still influence on it. Thus two related possibilities become meaningless: that humans have nothing to do with the climate's evolution or that they cannot influence the current process anymore. They become meaningless because we must maximise our chances, that is, we must act as if advancing towards sustainability could mitigate global warming or at least facilitating the least damaging adaptation to its effects. No other wager makes sense. However, the need to act does not automatically indicate how to do so. Hence the public debate. We know that social engineering on a huge scale can fail miserably - as the twentieth century comes to show. Still, in the manner of a global insurance policy, a strategy for mitigation and adaptation is necessary. This strategy should be orientated to make possible the **continuity**, not the dismantling, of our current society. Neither a programme for ruralisation nor the **low energy proposals** aimed to scale back society into a network of self-sufficient communities are **realistic** (see Trainer 2010). They represent the comeback of green utopianism, although their usefulness in the debate of ideas should not be neglected: their defence of a radical transformation is necessary for achieving a moderate change. As Dyer writes: I like living in a high-energy civilisation, and I don't want to give it up. If it can

be managed without causing a climate disaster, I would like everybody on the planet to live in wealthy societies that have the resources and the leisure to start looking after all citizens and not just the top dogs (Dyer 2008: 128). That is why climate change should "work for us", as Hulme and Neufeldt (2010) put it. It should be used for improving our societies through reform, not to pursue an unfeasible rupture based on a **miraculous** radical change in people's **values** (see Hourdequin 2010). It is more probable that people will follow a given virtuous **inertia** than to expect a sudden **moral epiphany** that clashes brutally with contemporary lifestyles - lifestyles that, despite the contempt that social science tends to show, people may well like. Therefore, in a nutshell, it is unlikely that citizens abandon their smartphones in order to embrace the charms of a more embedded rural life. It will simply not happen, cynical as it may sound. It also may sound Panglossian, since many today do not have enough money to acquire a telephone and the sources of dissatisfaction remain plentiful. It is in this connection that radical perspectives, namely, those wishing for some radical changes in the current sociopolitical organisation, are to be seen as the legitimate expression of unmet needs and desires deserving attention. This is true for global warming as it is true for other social problems. Yet we should not make mistakes when considering the sources of change. It is unlikely that the latter can be provoked by a sudden moral realisation on the part of relatively affluent citizens - it is more probable that a gradual evolution will take place, influenced by a multiplicity of factors, moral as well as economic and technological. On the other hand, a reformist and gradual approach to social change **does not preclude** the possibility that radical changes are the final outcome of an emergentist rather than a revolutionary process. Thus we should do the possible within the reasonable. But what does that mean? To begin with, it does not mean that the notion of sustainability presented so far has become invalidated. Unsurprisingly, classical environmentalists present climate change as the sudden and decisive proof that many old green positions happen to be right: nature is not abolished, human dominion of nature is not feasible, risks are everywhere. Therefore, we have been wrong and our worldview, together with our social organisation, must change. We cannot apply our old human solutions anymore: I am terrified by the hubris, the conceit, the arrogance implied by the words like "managing the planet" and "stabilising the climate". (...) Why are we, with our magnificent brains, so easily seduced by technocratic totalitarianism? (Tennekes in Hulme 2009: 312). However, we do not have any option other than trying to exert some degree of **control over climate**. After all, we find out what is going on with the climate because we try to exert such control (see Edwards 2010). Again, the latter should not be understood as a complete dominion, but rather as a sufficient, self-aware one. Mitigation policies are an attempt to influence climate - but I cannot see any arrogance in them. Furthermore, that we are able to discuss and devise strategies in the face of an abstract scientifically predicted threat should not be seen as a failure, but rather as a triumph of human reason. Similarly, the idea of an anthropogenic climate change does not demonstrate that nature has not ended, but rather comes to confirm in an unprecedented scale the merging of nature and society into the environment. As Leigh Glover puts it, "there is nothing natural left in the global atmosphere; humanity lives in and breathes an atmosphere that's an artifice of industrial activity and, consequently, the global climate is also now beyond nature" (Glover 2006: 254). If anything, climate change reinforces the case for a realistic sustainability. However, crucially, an advantage of climate change in this regard is that the kind of measures it demands - mitigation and adaptation in a wide scale should help to push the sustainability debate in the right direction. The reason is threefold. Firstly, climate change stresses by its very nature the issue of wellbeing and quality of life as much as that of pure survival. As the Hartwell Group (2010) has underlined, climate change is not so much a problem to be solved, as a condition to live and cope with. Thus we should take advantage of the changes it demands in order to live better. That is, in healthier urban environments, in knowledge-based economies, with the best public education and health care for all (see Baker 2006: 3). Thus

sustainability and well-being become linked. However, secondly, an adaptation based on the idea of well-being **cannot succeed without economic growth**. It is dubious that we can "manage without growth" (Victor 2008; see Jackson 2009), because tackling climate change and adapting to it is costly. Rich societies are better equipped to assimilate its impact than poor ones. As Nordhaus and Shellenberg note, environmentalism has always seen the economy as the cause rather than as the solution to ecological problems (Nordhaus and Shellenberg 2006). But, as a historic perspective shows, we can only be green while being rich. Neither the current understanding of economic growth nor the measurement of GDP for that reason should be exempt of criticism or amendment - changes can and ought to be made in order to reflect the environmental cost of economic activities. Yet the temptation to design people's well-being in a particular or detailed way should be avoided. It is rather a set of objective conditions of living under which subjective life-plans can be individually pursued that should be linked to climate change adaptation and hence to sustainability. For those conditions, which can be generally equated with the standards of current advanced societies, to be met, economic growth will remain necessary and desirable. Also because, thirdly, the idea that some sort of steady-state economy can be achieved and maintained is just a delusion. Sustainability must mirror the human condition: a dynamic type of development that by its very nature is open to further transformation (see Becker et al. 1999: 6; Gallopín and Raskin 2002: 6). Although technological change and economic development can be orientated towards sustainability, it is wishful thinking to believe that they can just be **stopped by decree**. Governments must design markets and create the institutional conditions that eventually lead to a reasonable mitigation and to a successful adaptation, but they should do so without pre-determining a particular direction, although at the same time they must make sure that certain minimum targets are met (see Patt et al. 2010). It is all a matter of creating an institutional and economic inertia that pushes business and citizens in the direction of sustainability. To some extent, we live now in a transitional time. In fact, notwithstanding the key importance the institutional and economic drivers, it is probably the gradual cultural change induced by the current global debate on global warming that will accelerate the transition to a greener, yet liberal and open, society. In sum, the kind of approach that climate change demands coincides with the foundations of an open view of sustainability. That is why reframing environmentalism entails reframing climate change: freeing it from the rhetoric of doom and incorporating it into a narrative of social refinement. Certainly, saying that climate change should be seen as an opportunity instead of a threat sounds like a cliché. But it happens to be true - or, to be more accurate, it can be made true.

Offshore Wind Specific Stuff

OSW Challenges the SQ

Offshore wind development is necessary to challenge the cult of wilderness – the idea that the sacred should be free from all forms of human intervention and that which has fallen no longer deserves human involvement

Wickersham 4 (Jay, Partner, Noble & Wickersham LLP, Cambridge, MA; Lecturer in Planning and Environmental Law, Harvard Graduate School of Design and Kennedy School of Government, “Sacred Landscapes and Profane Structures: How Offshore Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process,” 2004, 31 B.C. Env’tl. Aff. L. Rev. 325)

In closing, I would like to explore an unstated assumption that helps explain the opposition to the project: the **cult of wilderness**, which presumes that all human impacts on the natural environment are necessarily harmful. n119 To understand what I mean by the cult of wilderness, let's look at the rhetoric of opponents to the Cape Wind project. Attorney General Reilly and others have described Nantucket Sound as akin to the "Grand Canyon." n120 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has compared Nantucket Sound to "Yosemite," and said that for many people, "it's their only access to wilderness." n121 Historian David McCullough has said that the wind farm would ruin "one of the most beautiful unspoiled places in all America." n122 The Grand Canyon, Yosemite: these are the **sacred places** of the American cult of wilderness, consecrated in the scriptures of writers beginning with John Muir. n123 The legal designation that opponents favor is actually a **religious term**: "sanctuary." n124 One reason the wind farm turbines are proposed to be located more than three miles offshore, outside of Massachusetts territorial waters, is that Massachusetts has designated virtually all its coastal areas, with the exception of Boston Harbor, as "**ocean sanctuaries**," within which the construction or operation of an electrical generating station is prohibited. n125 Now there is a proposal that the federal waters of Nantucket Sound receive a comparable federal designation as a "marine sanctuary." n126 [*342] The quasi-religious value we ascribe to wilderness is America's most original contribution to environmentalism. n127 But as historian William Cronon writes in his essay, The Trouble with Wilderness, the **cult of wilderness as a sacred place** may also be the **greatest impediment** to our development of a sound attitude toward the natural environment. n128 The cult of wilderness distorts our perceptions and our actions. n129 Because designation of a place as a wilderness, an untouched place, may be required for it to receive legal protection, it encourages us to misrepresent the nature of places that we care about, to give them a **spurious history** free of any human intervention. n130 Second, the cult of wilderness encourages us to disregard places that do not qualify. Places that have received a visible human imprint are fallen, no longer sacred--and so they are no longer worthy of our protection and love. n131 As Michael Pollan has written: "Americans have done an admirable job of drawing lines around certain sacred areas . . . and a terrible job of managing the rest of our land." n132 I would like to draw particular attention to the visual aspect of the cult of wilderness because of its importance in the **offshore** wind **power debate**. The Grand Canyon and Yosemite are visual icons. In addition to making pilgrimages to these sacred places, we worship their images: from the paintings of Albert Bierstadt, to the photographs of Ansel Adams, to today's postcards and television travelogues and nature shows. Much of the opposition to the Cape Wind project derives from what we must presume is a sincere and deeply-held belief that the turbine towers are ugly to look at and that introducing these elements into Nantucket Sound will irretrievably damage the visual experience of that place. n133 I am not going to argue that aesthetics have no place in environmental impact review because of their inherent subjectivity. As Dorothy Bisbee's article discusses, the regulation of visual appearance is well founded in the law, and it should not necessarily be excluded [*343] by the NEPA/MEPA process. n134 But our analysis should acknowledge that our perceptions of beauty and visual impacts are cultural constructs, in a way that physical impacts on birds, or fish, or wave patterns, are not. As John Costonis has written in Icons and Aliens, the demand to regulate aesthetics is rooted in a sense of social dissonance. n135 Either a sacred structure or landscape (an "icon") is threatened with change or destruction, or there is a proposal to introduce a jarring element (**an** **"alien"**) into a well-defined context. n136 Often the two concepts go together and project opponents claim that it is the intrusion of an alien structure that threatens to destroy an iconic

landscape. n137 Yet as Costonis also points out, our notions of what is an icon and what is an alien are highly malleable: "one generation's alien is the next generation's icon." n138 In the late nineteenth century, a committee of three hundred concerned citizens organized themselves to try to protect a particularly well-beloved landscape from a large-scale industrial intrusion. n139 A landscape "without rival in the world" **would be "profaned"** and subject to "dishonor" due to the construction of a "ridiculously tall tower," which they characterized as "the grotesque, mercantile imaginings of a constructor of machines." n140 The iconic landscape was the city of Paris; the alien was the Eiffel Tower. In a sense, the opponents were right. The Eiffel Tower was wildly out of scale with a predominantly low-rise city; its exposed steel construction jarred with the predominant aesthetic of classical buildings rendered [*344] in stone. n141 And yet **the alien has become an icon**; today the Eiffel Tower is the most recognizable and best loved symbol of Paris. n142

Challenging Sacred Good

Challenging the sacredness of wilderness is essential to break down cultural imperialism and solve environmental problems – dualistic notions of humanity and the environment reinforce the notion that we are separate from our surroundings.

Cronon 95 (William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,”

ed., *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90;

http://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble_with_Wilderness_Main.html)

The removal of Indians to create an “**uninhabited wilderness**”—uninhabited as never before in the human

history of the place—reminds us just how invented, just how **constructed**, the American wilderness really is. To return to my opening argument: there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness. It is entirely a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny. Indeed, one of the most striking proofs of the cultural invention of wilderness is its thoroughgoing erasure of the history from which it sprang.

In virtually all of its manifestations, wilderness represents a **flight from history**. Seen as the original garden, it is a place outside of time, from which human beings had to be ejected before the fallen world of history could properly begin. Seen as the frontier, it is a savage world at the dawn of civilization, whose transformation represents the very beginning of the national historical epic. Seen as the bold landscape of frontier heroism, it is the place of youth and childhood, into which men escape by abandoning their pasts and entering a world of freedom where the constraints of civilization fade into memory. Seen as the **sacred sublime**, it is the home of a God who transcends history by standing as the One who remains untouched and unchanged by time’s arrow. No matter what the angle from which we regard it, wilderness offers us the illusion that we can escape the cares and troubles of the world in which our past has ensnared us. (25) This escape from history is one reason why the language we use to talk about wilderness is often permeated with **spiritual and religious values** that reflect human ideals far more than the

material world of physical nature. Wilderness fulfills the old romantic project of secularizing Judeo-Christian values so as to make a new cathedral not in some petty human building but in God’s own creation, Nature itself. Many environmentalists who reject traditional notions of the Godhead and who regard themselves as agnostics or even atheists nonetheless express feelings tantamount to religious awe when in the presence of wilderness—a fact that testifies to the success of the romantic project. Those who have no difficulty seeing God as the expression of our human dreams and desires nonetheless have trouble recognizing that in a secular age Nature can offer precisely the same sort of mirror. Thus it is that wilderness serves as the unexamined foundation on which so many of the quasi-religious values of modern environmentalism rest. The critique of modernity that is one of environmentalism’s most important contributions to the moral and political discourse of our time more often than not appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to wilderness as the standard against which to measure the failings of our human world. **Wilderness is the natural, unfallen antithesis of an unnatural civilization that has lost its soul.** It is a place of freedom in which we can recover the true selves we have lost to the corrupting influences of our artificial lives. Most of all, it is the ultimate landscape of authenticity. Combining the sacred grandeur of the sublime with the primitive simplicity of the frontier, it is the place where we can see the world as it really is, and so know ourselves as we really are—or ought to be. But the trouble with wilderness is that it quietly

expresses and reproduces the very values its devotees seek to reject. The flight from history that is very nearly the core of wilderness represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, the illusion that we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past and return to the tabula rasa that supposedly existed before we began to leave our marks on the world. The dream of an unworked natural landscape is very much the fantasy of people who have never themselves had to work the land to make a living—urban folk for whom food comes from a supermarket or a restaurant instead of a field, and for whom the wooden houses in which they live and work apparently have no meaningful connection to the forests in which trees grow and die. Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated could hold up wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic ideology of wilderness leaves precisely

nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the land. This, then, is the central paradox: wilderness embodies a **dualistic vision** in which the human is entirely outside the natural. If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in nature represents its fall. The place where we are is the place where nature is not. If this is so—**if by definition wilderness leaves no place for human beings**, save perhaps as contemplative sojourners enjoying their leisurely reverie in God's natural cathedral—then also by definition it can offer no solution to the environmental and other problems that confront us. To the extent that we celebrate wilderness as the measure with which we judge civilization, **we reproduce the dualism that sets humanity and nature at opposite poles**. We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like. Worse: to the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the wilderness, to just that extent we give ourselves permission to **evade responsibility** for the lives we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit. In its flight from history, in its siren song of escape, in its reproduction of the dangerous dualism that sets human beings outside of nature—in all of these ways, wilderness poses a **serious threat** to responsible environmentalism at the end of the twentieth century. By now I hope it is clear that my criticism in this essay is not directed at wild nature per se, or even at efforts to set aside large tracts of wild land, but rather at the specific **habits of thinking** that flow from this complex cultural construction called wilderness. It is not the things we label as wilderness that are the problem—for nonhuman nature and large tracts of the natural world do deserve protection—but rather what we ourselves mean when we use the label. Let me list some of the places where wilderness serves as the ideological underpinning for environmental concerns that might otherwise seem quite remote from it. Defenders of biological diversity, for instance, although sometimes appealing to more utilitarian concerns, often point to “untouched” ecosystems as the best and richest repositories of the undiscovered species we must certainly try to protect. Although at first blush an apparently more “scientific” concept than wilderness, biological diversity in fact invokes many of the same sacred values, which is why organizations like the Nature Conservancy have been so quick to employ it as an alternative to the seemingly fuzzier and more problematic concept of wilderness. There is a paradox here, of course. To the extent that biological diversity (indeed, even wilderness itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant and self-conscious management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology of wilderness is potentially in direct conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect. (26) The most striking instances of this have revolved around “endangered species,” which serve as vulnerable symbols of biological diversity while at the same time standing as surrogates for wilderness itself. The terms of the Endangered Species Act in the United States have often meant that those hoping to defend pristine wilderness have had to rely on a single endangered species like the spotted owl to gain legal standing for their case—thereby making the full power of the sacred land inhere in a single numinous organism whose habitat then becomes the object of intense debate about appropriate management and use. (27) The ease with which anti-environmental forces like the wise-use movement have attacked such single-species preservation efforts suggests the vulnerability of strategies like these. Perhaps partly because our own conflicts over such places and organisms have become so messy, the convergence of wilderness values with concerns about biological diversity and endangered species has helped produce a deep fascination for remote ecosystems, where it is easier to imagine that nature might somehow be “left alone” to flourish by its own pristine devices. The classic example is the tropical rain forest, which since the 1970s has become the **most powerful modern icon of unfallen, sacred land**—a veritable Garden of Eden—for many Americans and Europeans. And yet protecting the rain forest in the eyes of First World environmentalists all too often means protecting it from the people who live there. Those who seek to preserve such “wilderness” from the activities of native peoples run the risk of **reproducing the same tragedy**—being forcibly removed from an ancient home—that befell American Indians. Third World countries face massive environmental problems and deep social conflicts, but these are not likely to be solved by a cultural myth that encourages us to “preserve” peopleless landscapes that have not existed in such places for millennia. At its worst, as environmentalists are beginning to realize, exporting American notions of wilderness in this way can become an unthinking and self-defeating form of **cultural imperialism**. (28)

We must recognize that everything is wilderness – there is no such thing as a pristine ecosystem. Only by doing this can we truly hope to view ourselves as part of our surroundings

Bailey 11 (Ronald – award-winning science correspondent for Reason, Emma Marris is a writer for Nature,

“The Myth of Pristine Nature A review of Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World”, 8/16, <http://reason.com/archives/2011/08/16/the-myth-of-pristine>)

“**Nature is almost everywhere**. But wherever it is, there is one thing nature is not: pristine,” writes science journalist Emma Marris in her engaging new book Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-Wild World. She adds, “We must temper our romantic notion of untrammelled wilderness and find room next to it for the more nuanced notion of a global, half-wild rambunctious garden, tended by us.” Marris’ message will discomfort both environmental activists and most ecologists who are in thrall to the damaging cult of pristine wilderness and the false ideology of the balance of nature. But it should encourage and inspire the rest of us. Marris begins by exposing the vacuity of the notion of the ecological baseline. “For many conservationists, restoration to a pre-human or a pre-European baseline is seen as healing a wounded or sick nature,” explains Marris. “For others, it is an ethical duty. We broke it; therefore we must fix it. Baselines thus typically don’t act as a scientific before to compare with an after. They become the good, the goal, the one correct state.” **What is so good about historical**

ecosystems? I too have noted that ecologists when asked this same question become almost inarticulate. They just know that historical ecosystems are better. So many ecologists set the historical baseline as the condition of ecosystems before Europeans arrived. Why? The fact is that primitive peoples killed off the largest species in North and South America, Australia and Pacific Islands thousands of years ago. For example, after people showed up about 14,000 years ago, North America lost 60 or so species of tasty mammals that weighed over 100 pounds, including giant ground sloths, mammoths, mastodons, cheetahs, camels, and glyptodonts. Marris argues that the cult of pristine wilderness was created by nature romantics like John Muir. Muir is famous for advocating that the Yosemite Valley be turned into a national park. As Marris notes, wild nature for Muir was a necessity for “tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people” suffering from “the vice of over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury.” And for some people it might be—but that is not a scientific claim about ecosystems and their “integrity.” In fact, Marris reports that **there is precious little scientific support** for the ideology that pristine nature is somehow “better” than the mélange that humanity has created by moving species around the globe. For example, she visits Hawaii where half of the plant species now living on the islands are non-native. One brave younger ecologist, Joe Mascaro, studies novel ecosystems that are developing on Hawaii that incorporate both native and non-native species. Among other things, Mascaro “found that the novel forests, on average, had just as many species as native forests” and “that in many measures of forest productivity, such as nutrient cycling and biomass, novel forests matched or outproduced the native forests.” Marris contrasts Mascaro with another ecologist, Christian Giardina, who helps manage the Laupahoehoe Natural Area Reserve in Hawaii from which he wants to extirpate non-natives. Yet even Giardina muses over dinner, “Are we so religious about this biodiversity ethic that we need to be called on it?” He answers his own question: “If you really dig down to why we should care, you end up with nothing. You are running on faith that we should care.” Although Marris doesn’t cite him, she is plowing much the same intellectual ground as University of Maryland philosopher Marc Sagoff. Sagoff has challenged ecologists to name any specifically ecological criterion by which scientists can objectively determine whether an ecosystem whose history they don’t know has been invaded or not.

Are invaded ecosystems less productive? No. Are they less species-rich? No. And so on. In fact, Sagoff points out that **there is** **no objective criterion** for distinguishing between “disturbed” ecosystems and allegedly pristine

ones. Marris also cites research that shows that the notion of the “balance of nature” is scientifically specious. Early in the 20th century influential ecologist Frederic Clements developed the theory that each ecosystem tended toward a stable climax that, once achieved, was perfectly balanced unless disturbed by people. Each participant in the climax ecosystem fitted tightly into niches as a result of coevolving together. However, ecologist Henry Gleason, a contemporary of Clements, countered that **ecosystems**

were assembled by chance just depending on what species got there first and were successful in competing with other species as they arrived. For the most part, 20th century ecologists fell into the Clements’ camp. Now we know now that Gleason was far more right than Clements—ecosystems are largely assembled by chance. For example, northern temperate forests are composed of an assemblage of species that mixed together as they raced northward out of various refugia as the glaciers retreated. Although Marris mentions it briefly, one of the more fascinating novel ecosystems is the accidental rainforest created on Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. A little over 150 years ago, the British navy began receiving shipments of trees and shrubs from all over the world from the collections at Kew Gardens in London. Once planted, they took hold and have transformed the

bare peak once known as White Mountain into Green Mountain today. Species don't need to coevolve to create fully functioning ecosystems [PDF]; they make the best of what they have. Only when the ecologically-correct ideologies that blind us are upended can we see the real nature that is all around us. Baselines are properly transformed into aesthetic choices rather than "scientific" mandates. For example, Marris discusses the ambitious Pleistocene Rewilding proposal in which proxy wild species from Africa might be used to replace those North American species killed off by early peoples. African cheetahs might chase after pronghorns, and elephants graze where mastodons once did. A small version of rewilding is the fascinating Oostvaardersplassen [PDF] experiment where researchers are designing an ecosystem that aims to mimic what Northern Europe might have looked like 10,000 years ago. It is stocked with herds of Konik horses and Heck cattle, thought to be respectively similar to the tarpan horses and the aurochs that once roamed Europe. The newly constructed ecosystem has attracted many wild species that have long been absent from the Netherlands. It is still missing predators, but wolves are apparently moving westward from Eastern Europe. Marris argues that the conservation and appreciation of nature can take place at far less exotic locations, such as backyards, city parks, farms, and even parking lots. If biodiversity is what is of interest, she notes that the Los Angeles area is home to 60 native tree species, but now hosts 145 species. "With eight to eleven tree species per hectare, L.A. is more diverse than many ecosystem types," she writes. Another researcher has identified 227 species of bee living in New York City. And if some of us choose to conserve some areas as "pristine" with regard to some preferred aesthetic baseline, that's O.K. Certainly science can be used to help achieve that goal, but such areas become essentially wilderness gardens maintained by "perpetual weeding and perpetual watching." This gracefully written and well-argued book deserves a wide readership. One hopes that readers will take to heart Marris' chief insight about conservation: "There is no one best goal." She bravely and correctly concludes, "We've forever altered the Earth, and so now we cannot abandon it to a random fate. It is our duty to manage it. Luckily, it can be a pleasant, even joyful task if we embrace it in the right spirit. Let the rambunctious gardening begin."

Dualism Bad

This dualistic relationship with nature is the root cause of our anthropocentric mindset. Starting from any other point prevents an effective understanding of oppression and humanity

Plumwood 4 (Val – Famous Australian Philosopher, “Environmental Justice”, 2004, <http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C14/E1-37-03-04.pdf>)

4. Interspecies Justice The dominant position in the West has insisted that concepts of justice are confined to the human sphere and to intra-human relationships. I will argue, to the contrary, that we can map a range of ethical stances and components of justice onto interspecies relationships and **human treatment of non-human nature** and that **there are important insights** to be gained from doing so and **to be lost from refusing to do** SO. There are some important choices between different ways to make such mappings, some of which I discuss below. I will argue against closed, extensionist mappings of justice that try to confine interspecies ethics to sentient or conscious beings, recognizing only those nonhumans who are believed most closely to resemble humans. These positions may avoid the most extreme and blatant forms of species injustice, but they retain most of the problems of moral dualism and do little to help us change our perceptions or behavior in ways relevant to the environmental crisis. But primary concepts of justice as giving others their due, and as distributional and proportional justice, are not confined to intrahuman relationships, and have an application to the non-human sphere and interspecies relationships. An important concept of injustice as “prejudice” is concerned with the impediments to justice presented by prior reductive or oppressive conceptions of the other, as in **colonialism, racism, and sexism**, and this concept of justice has, I shall argue, a clear application to the non-human sphere. The denial of concepts of justice to the non-human sphere, which is thus treated ethically as “other,” is itself a form of injustice. 4.1. Prejudice and Injustice There is injustice in the traditional stances of the dominant culture that would deny any application of ethics to non-humans, treating humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derive those limited ethical constraints they admit on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. These extreme positions are fairly obvious and easy to recognize **as forms of anthropocentrism**. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various forms and guises, so there are weaker and stronger, more upfront and more subtle forms of human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, traditions of general and direct ethical exclusion for non-humans are strongly defended by many philosophers and some environmentalists. Some philosophers, most notably Kant, have advocated admitting the others of the earth indirectly to ethical status, because we can learn from cruelty to animals “bad habits” that affect our behavior towards those who really count, human beings. Such indirect positions are heavily human centered because non-humans are admitted to value only in a secondary way, entirely as a function of their relationship to humans. Other philosophers are critical of these strong forms of human centeredness, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. Recent environmental ethics has produced many examples of more subtle anthropocentric forms, for example assimilationist positions that allocate moral consideration or value to non-human beings entirely on the basis of their similarity to the human. Such claims are unjust for non-humans in the same way that assimilationist frameworks that allocate worth to individuals of another culture, for example an aboriginal culture, just on the basis of their similarity to the dominant (white) colonizing culture are unjust. We should not begin this inquiry into justice for non-humans with the assumption that we start from a condition of tabula rasa, that we have no conceptual mappings already, or that they are neutral. On the contrary, those of us from Western backgrounds start out from a tradition that has consistently mapped non-humans onto human others, and accorded both less than justice. Dominant traditions over at least 25 centuries have identified the human normatively with the rational, and both the non-human and the human other with relative absence of reason and corresponding proximity to nature and the earth. Women have been consistently identified with lack of reason and with animals and, by Hegel, with a plant-like form of existence. The humanistic revolution of the Enlightenment replaced the rational hierarchy built on a complex set of reason/nature dualisms with a simpler and starker mental and moral **dualism between humans and non-humans**. In the Cartesian mind/body dualism, for example, non-humans are hyper-separated from humans by their alleged lack of “thought,” and are subject to an extreme form of homogenization that consigns them uniformly to the same inconsiderable category as

the least considerable and most instrumentalized among them, which for Descartes was the machine. Modern conceptions of nature, even those of supposedly liberatory versions of environmental ethics, have not fully broken with these traditions of human and rational supremacy, although they minimize our ability to render justice and our sensitivity to the other, human and non-human. Questions of justice for non-human nature—including the question of ethical recognition and the critique of human-supremacist or anthropocentric values and ethical standards—were intensely debated over the three decades of environmental philosophy at the end of the twentieth century. I am among those environmental philosophers who say that Western culture is locked into an ecologically destructive form of rationality that is human centered, or “anthropocentric,” treating non-human nature as a sphere of inferior and replaceable “others.” Human supremacism and anthropocentrism are incompatible with justice to other species. Human supremacism in its strongest forms refuses ethical recognition to non-humans, treating nature as just a resource we can make use of however we wish. It sees humans, and only humans, as ethically significant in the universe, and derives those limited ethical constraints it admits on the way we can use nature and animals entirely indirectly, from harms to other humans. But just as other forms of supremacism and centrism, for example those based on race and gender, appear in various guises, so there are weaker and stronger, more obvious and **more subtle forms of human supremacism** and

human centeredness. Despite our contemporary context of accelerating human destruction of the non-human world, some philosophers and traditionalists have been reluctant to censure even strong forms of human supremacism. Others are critical of these strong forms, but nevertheless cling to subtler forms that remain anthropocentric and are overly restrictive in their ethical recognition of non-humans. The most human-like “higher animals,” who are claimed to be the only possessors among the non-humans of the supposedly defining human characteristic of awareness, says Peter Singer, may be admitted to the ethical sphere, but the door is firmly closed against all others. This strategy is aptly termed “neo-Cartesianism” or “minimalism.” It aims to enlarge the human sphere of justice rather than ethically to integrate human and non-human spheres, a strategy that results in minimal further admissions to the privileged class. It minimally challenges anthropocentric ranking regimes that base the worth of beings on their degree of conformity to human norms or resemblance to an idealized “rational” or “conscious” humanity; and it often aims explicitly at minimal deviations from the prevailing political assumptions and dominant human-centered ethic they are tied into. It tends to minimize recognition of diversity, focusing on ethically relevant qualities like mind, consciousness, and communication only in forms resembling the human and failing to recognize that they can be expressed in many different, often incommensurable, forms in an ethically and ecologically rich and diverse world. I contrast below this minimalist ethical stance of closure with a more generous eco-justice stance of openness and recognition towards non-humans that acknowledges ethical diversity and critiques anthropocentric moral dualism as the “othering” of the non-human world, a form of injustice that closely parallels racial and gender injustice in both conceiving and making the other radically less than they are or can become. Moral dualism makes an emphatic division of the world into two starkly contrasting orders, consisting of those privileged beings considered subject to full-blown ethical concern as “humans” or “persons,” and the remainder, considered beneath ethical concern and as belonging to an instrumental realm of resources (or, in the prevailing political context, of “property”), available to the first group. Both the traditional humansupremacist position that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class of humans and the minimalist animal rights variation that refuses any extension of ethics beyond the class it considers conscious (persons) are moral dualisms. Typically, moral dualism organizes moral concepts so that they apply in an all-or-nothing way: for example, a being either has a full-blown “right” to equal treatment with humans, or it is not subject to any form of ethical consideration at all. As I will show below, there are good reasons to reject moral dualism. We have many opportunities to organize the ethical field differently; some ethical concepts and practices of recognition and justice, for example, can be applied to humans and also to non-human animals and nature more generally. And ethically relevant qualities such as mind, communication, consciousness, and sensitivity to others are organized in multiple and diverse ways across life forms that do not correspond to the all-or-nothing scenarios assumed by moral dualism. In both the human and the non-human case, a politics of conflict can be played out around these moral dualisms, in which the moral exclusion of the class defined as “resource” is represented as a benefit or even a moral duty to less fortunate members of the human or person class, and the rejection of moral dualism is represented as depriving underprivileged humans of resources that are

rightfully theirs. Much humanist rhetoric has involved policing exaggerated boundaries of moral considerability and forming a pan-human identity in the same way as racist and macho (male-bonding) identities, building solidarity within the human group through **creating an inferiorized non-**

human out-group of others that the pan-human identity is defined against. The exclamation “What are we—animals?—to be treated like this!” both implicitly appeals to such an identity, and implies that ill treatment is appropriate for animals. Moral dualism helps to construct concern for non-human nature in this conflictual way, as a deficit of attention or concern for some less privileged human group, although the remorseless conflict scenario this assumes can usually be reconceived in complementary rather than competitive ways. As in the case of conflicts within the sphere of human justice, we have, I believe, an overriding, higher-order obligation to try to circumvent and reduce or eliminate such justice conflicts where possible, and to avoid multiplying and reinforcing them. This translates into an obligation to favor, where they are available, complementary over competitive constructions of justice spheres, other things being equal. We need then to attend to the ways in which both human and non-human spheres of justice, although not free of some limited and sometimes manufactured conflicts of this kind, can be

constructed not as competitive but as complementary approaches that need and strengthen each other. Thus we should note that moral dualism is also a moral boomerang that too often returns to strike down humanity itself when allegedly “lower” orders of humans are assimilated to nature and to animals, as they have been systematically throughout Western history. Conversely, many forms of ethical practice and sensitivity to others are not only not especially sensitive to whether these others are human or non-human, but can actually be strengthened and deepened generally when we refuse the arbitrary exclusion of non-human others and the self-improvement and blunting of sensibilities exclusion involves. One reason for rejecting moral dualism is that its stance of closure unnecessarily blunts our sensitivity to the excluded class and those assimilated to them, and this can involve prudential hazards as well as injustices. It is in our interests as well as the interests of the other to adopt a less impoverished ethical stance and view of the other. Thus, by refusing recognition to nature we lose not only an ethically but also a **prudentially**

crucial set of connections that link human and non-human movements for liberation and justice. By blunting our sensitivity to nature and animals we lose a prudentially important set of insights that can help us to reflect on our limitations as human actors and observers and correct crucial blind spots in our relationships with the more-than-human world. Further, **the attempt to articulate various forms of recognition for nature**, and to counter anthropocentrism, is important for practical activism in a number of ways, and also affects the way political alliances between groups can be formed. Such a recognition is crucial for the birth of the new communicative and care paradigm for the human—

nature relationship that must now, in an age of ecological limits, take the place of the mechanistic paradigm associated with the past centuries of human expansion and conquest.